Militia, Zombies and Cheese

Indiana Guard Reserve (IGR)

2011-05-05T19:33:00.000-07:00

http://www.mdisdf.org/index.html

The Indiana Guard Reserve (IGR) is a service oriented, community-based, military organization authorized by Indiana law as a supplement to the Indiana Army National Guard based at sixty-six Indiana Army National Guard Armories throughout the State of Indiana.

Opportunity is knocking. We are looking for Indiana citizens just like your self --- men and women who once served in the military services or those who would like to, but missed that chance. Now is your opportunity to become a member of the IGR . You can now serve by being a member of the IGR and assisting in the well-being of your community.

Indiana Guard Reserve Is exclusive. Not everyone meets entrance requirements.Applicants must meet certain standards of conduct and appearance.

Indiana Guard Reserve Is An All Volunteer Organization. There is no pay for drills or reimbursement for travel expenses, no uniform allowance, and accrual of points toward retirements. There is no required duty outside the State of Indiana. However, IGR volunteers are authorized to wear the state military uniform, and receive the sincere appreciation of the communities they serve. As a volunteer, you will experience the camaraderie and the pride of military service.

Indiana Guard Reserve drills. Unit drills are held once a month, usually on Saturday. Also, Guard Reservists attend annual training for two and one half days each fall at Camp Atterbury, normally the second weekend in September. This training covers subjects such as the National Incident Management System (NIMS), family assistance, armory support activities, communications and other facets of the unit mission.

Indiana Guard Reserve Rank & Promotions are based upon your civilian and military experience, schooling, duty performance, potential, education and needs of the IGR. Accession for prior service veterans is at the last federally recognized rank.

State Military Uniforms: As a member of the IGR you are authorized to wear the U.S. Army Service Uniform (Dress Blues), Army Green Class A and B, as well as the Army Combat Uniform (ACU). Wear of Army uniforms is authorized by the Adjutant General with minor insignia modifications. Military decorations from your prior service along with IGR and Indiana State awards are authorized for wear.

Indiana Guard Reserve Qualification: You may apply if you are 18 - 65 years of age, are in good health, have no felony conviction or pending criminal charges, have never been convicted of desertion or classified as disloyal. Active members of the US Armed Forces or Reserve are not eligible for membership in the Indiana Guard Reserve. Veterans of any branch of the Uniformed Services, with service verified by DD 214 (Statement of Military Service), are welcome.

Indiana Guard Reserve Location: IGR Headquarters is located at 2002 South Holt Road, Indianapolis IN 46421-4839. The telephone number is 800-237-3300 extension 4038. You may also email Ms Nicole Edmonds, the IGR Administrative Assistant

Appointment/Enlistment Form: Download IGR Enlistment Application MDI-IGR 10-4-1-R Print and complete the form, and forward to IGR Headquarters along with a copy of your DD Form 214 or NGB Form 22 if you have prior military service.

Alaska State Defense Force, Wikipedia

2011-04-28T23:47:00.000-07:00

Alaska State Defense Force

Description

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The Alaska State Defense Force (ASDF) is the State Defense Force of Alaska. It is one of 23 such forces in the U.S. states.

The Alaska State Defense Force is the successor of the Alaska Territorial Guard founded during World War II. After the war ended and Alaska became a state in 1959, the Territorial Guard was disbanded but was replaced by a state militia established by state statute. In 1984, the Alaska State Guard was formed; it was renamed in 1987 as the Alaska State Defense Force. In 2004, the name 49th Military Police Brigade (49th MP BDE) was also adopted for it, but it is still mainly known as the Alaska State Defense Force. A recent realignment of the command's structure has utilized the new designation of 49th Readiness Brigade (Separate).

The Alaska State Defense Force is administered under the state Department of Veterans Affairs, but is headed by a commander who reports directly to the governor of Alaska, who acts as commander-in-chief of the state defense force.

Mission

The mission of the Alaska State Defense Force is to maintain an organized, trained military force capable of timely and effective response to state emergencies, or, on other occasions deemed appropriate by the Governor, to provide military assistance to civil and military authorities in the preservation of life, property, and public safety.

Alaska's constitution declares every able-bodied man from age 18 to 70 to be a member of the state militia. The ASDF is constituted as a cadre of experienced officers and enlisted personnel which is ready to organize the entire population, if need be.

Source

Description above from the Wikipedia article Alaska State Defense Force, licensed under CC-BY-SA, full list of contributors here. Community Pages are not affiliated with, or endorsed by, anyone associated with the topic.

Description

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The Alaska State Defense Force (ASDF) is the State Defense Force of Alaska. It is one of 23 such forces in the U.S. states.

Mission

Source

Arizona raises the bar

2011-04-22T23:59:00.000-07:00

http://blog.heritage.org/2011/04/22/arizona-takes-a-smart-step-on-state-guard-units/

Arizona Takes a Smart Step on State Guard Units

Posted April 22nd, 2011 at 2:36pm in Protect America with 1 comments Print This Post

As states continue to face large deficits and budget cuts, Arizona has hit on a smart solution.

On Tuesday, the Arizona House of Representatives passed S.B. 1495, a bill enhancing the power of the governor to create a state guard unit. These units, better known as State Defense Forces (SDFs), are today’s modern state militia. Unlike the images of rag-tag groups often associated with the term militia, these are professional forces authorized by the Constitution and under the command of their respective state governors.

Arizona stands to gain a great deal from the invaluable force multipliers they provide at virtually no cost to the states or tax payers. These all-volunteer forces are comprised largely of former military members and other public servants with a vast array of experience. For the most part, these SDF members are unpaid, except in some cases when called to active duty by the governor. They freely give of their own time and money for training, uniforms, and equipment to help provide for the security of their states.

SDFs also possess a wealth of vital local knowledge. Unable to be called to federal service like the National Guard, SDFs are stationed within their states at all times. They have key knowledge of the area and vital relationships within the community that, in the event of a natural disaster or other emergency, can be essential to an organized and orderly recovery and response effort. These first responders have proved themselves time and again, be it their quick and capable response after 9/11 or their answer to the call to action following Hurricane Katrina.

The local militia is an American tradition that dates back to the Revolutionary War. Arizona will truly benefit from putting this pillar of American history—the citizen soldier—to good use, and other states would be wise to follow suit. As states continue to face large deficits and budget cuts, the low-cost, high-value assets of the SDFs cannot be ignored.

2011-04-05T21:11:00.000-07:00

http://gasdf.com/index.htm

MISSION ESSENTIAL TASK LIST (METL)*

Support and augment Georgia National Guard forces
Provide professional skills to the Georgia Department of Defense
Assist Georgia Communities

METL-DERIVED COMMON TASKS*

Disaster Reconnaissance
Traffic/Evacuation Control
Area Isolation/Area Safety
Evacuee Shelter Augmentation
EOC/SOC Augmentation
Special Skill Support to GADOD

Search and Rescue Operations
Guard Family Assistance Support
Base and Field Medical Support
Crowd Control/Event Safety
Facilities Safety
Other Tasks as Authorized

* Reflects the Georgia State Defense Force peacetime METL and those Common Tasks derived there from that have been authorized for Georgia State Defense Force execution.

2011-03-24T00:50:00.000-07:00

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/mar/23/carafano-small-answers-to-big-problems/?page=1

CARAFANO:

Small answers to big problems

By James Jay Carafano

The Washington Times

8:26 p.m., Wednesday, March 23, 2011

ANALYSIS/OPINION:

The disaster in Japan reminds us that in an epic catastrophe, a nation may be forced to deal with a wide range of troubles. Such disasters are often referred to as “black swans,” dangers we view as remote and thus don’t dwell on — but that prove incredibly difficult to handle if they do occur.

In Japan, officials wisely ordered people to “shelter in place” to avoid unnecessary radiological exposure. Unfortunately, truck drivers — fearing contamination — refused to deliver goods to towns near the nuclear reactors. Now the locals are running out of food.

When a government tells people to shelter, it should have a plan to get them supplies and medical aid. Without a workable plan, there’s a problem. Tokyo has a problem.

In the midst of a crisis, government must deliver a credible response. When people think government is functioning and responsible, they react with discipline, composure and self-confidence. When they think government has failed them, things start to break down. Tokyo has watched its credibility melt as fast as the core of the damaged nuclear reactors. That is a problem, too.

There’s an old combat saying: “You can’t have enough friends in the foxhole.” That holds true in any disaster, not just a shooting war. Successful response means using the resources at your disposal to maximum effect. In the U.S., one crucial capability for disaster response that is woefully underused is State Defense Forces.

The Founding Fathers believed that a well-regulated militia was “the ultimate guardian of liberty.” They codified that in the Constitution. Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution reserves for the “States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia.” States have raised and maintained them ever since.

Today, the best-known “militias” are the National Guard units that serve under the command of state governors and the civil authorities in U.S. territories (including the District of Columbia). Those can be federalized and serve as part of the “active-duty” military.

In addition to guard units, 23 states and territories have defense forces. Unlike the National Guard, those forces serve no federal function. In times of both war and peace, State Defense Forces remain solely under the control of their governors or territorial officials and are available for rapid deployment in the event of a natural or man-made disaster. Arguably best of all in this era of tight budgets, the defense forces are all-volunteer units.

Those forces are an important resource for the states that have them. The Alaskan State Defense Force aids in safeguarding the Alaska oil pipeline. After Sept. 11, 2011, the New York Guard, New York Naval Militia and New Jersey Naval Militia were activated to assist in response measures, recovery efforts and critical infrastructure security.

State Defense Forces can cross state lines to serve their fellow Americans. Forces from at least eight states, including Texas, Maryland, Virginia and Tennessee, contributed more than 2,250 highly skilled volunteers in support of recovery efforts after Hurricane Katrina. Some traveled to Louisiana and Mississippi to provide direct assistance to victims. Others stayed in their states, taking over the responsibilities of National Guard units that were deployed to assist in the recovery.

These volunteer groups are particularly effective. Many are filled with retired military, law enforcement and emergency managers, providing a wealth of disaster-response experience. Technical units such as medical and communication squads are staffed by trauma surgeons, cybersecurity engineers and other career professionals.

In many cases, these volunteers have proved to be the best and most dependable responders. They dedicate their time and often pay for their own training and equipment. They are the most committed kind of volunteers — and the most cost-effective. In 2002 alone, for example, the Georgia State Guard reportedly saved Georgia $1.5 million by providing 1,797 days of operational service to the state.

In a large-scale catastrophe, these organized, disciplined and capable responders could serve a vital role. Yet 28 states and the District of Columbia have chosen not to create such forces.

In some of those jurisdictions, proposals to create Defense Forces have met resistance from the adjutant generals (who command state and territorial National Guard forces). Such objections make little sense, given that these forces are entirely volunteer organizations and offer the states a robust, low-cost force multiplier.

The District of Columbia has a bill under consideration to create a defense force for the city. Now — before disaster strikes — is the right time to think seriously about establishing guards.

• James Jay Carafano is a senior national security analyst at the Heritage Foundation.

Proposal to the District of Columbia City Council

2011-03-15T03:33:00.000-07:00

http://www.heritage.org/Research/Testimony/2011/03/Improving-the-Security-of-the-District-of-Columbia-with-a-DC-Defense-Force

This is a Testimony On District Of Columbia

Improving the Security of the District of Columbia with a D.C. Defense Force Bill 18-403, “DC Official Code Title 49 Enactment Act of 2009”

Published on March 14, 2011 by James Carafano, Ph.D.

Testimony before the
Council of the District of Columbia

Delivered March 14, 2011

My name is James Jay Carafano. I am the Deputy Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies and the Director of Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation. The views I express in this testimony are my own, and should not be construed as representing any official position of The Heritage Foundation.

Mr. Chairman, I am honored to testify before the Council of the District of Columbia today. In my testimony, I would like to (1) provide the Council with necessary information about state militias, commonly referred to as State Defense Forces; (2) explain the constitutional authority that provides for State Defense Forces; and (3) demonstrate that such a unit would greatly enhance the security of our nation’s capital at practically no cost to the District Government.

State militias have helped to defend the United States since the Revolutionary War. Bolstered by the Founding Fathers’ concerns about maintaining a large standing army and preserved within the Constitution, the concept of the citizen-soldier has become ingrained in American culture and government.

Twenty-three states and territories currently have Defense Forces, which are distinct from the Reserves and the National Guard in that they serve no federal function. In times of both war and peace, State Defense Forces remain solely under the control of their governors, or in the case of the District of Columbia, the mayor, allowing for rapid deployment in the event of a natural or man-made disaster. Ultimately, State Defense Forces provide a cost-effective, vital force multiplier, especially if state National Guard units are deployed.

Despite its recognition in federal statute, creation of a State Defense Force remains at the discretion of each state governor, or in D.C., the council and mayor. State Defense Forces are entirely volunteer organizations. Members are not paid for training, and only some states compensate them for active duty. State Defense Forces generally require little equipment, posing minimal cost to the state or to the District. In fact, in 2002 alone, the Georgia State Guard reportedly saved the state of Georgia $1.5 million by providing 1,797 days of operational service to the state.

State Defense Forces have two important advantages. First, State Defense Forces are continually stationed within their respective states and can be called upon quickly and easily in times of need. Such a capability is particularly important when catastrophic disasters overwhelm local first responders and federal forces can take up to 72 hours to respond. State Defense forces also generally know the area and the resources at hand better than federal forces, giving them a vital advantage during emergency response. Second, State Defense Forces are exempt from the restrictions of the Posse Comitatus Act, which prohibits federal military forces from engaging in domestic law enforcement activities within the United States. While the Posse Comitatus Act has never proved a major obstacle to deploying federal forces for domestic emergency response, State Defense Forces permit a state military response unhampered by legal obstacles, allowing the D.C. Government to provide for its own interests without having to wait on the federal government to respond.

With the exception of the D.C. National Guard, every other National Guard unit in the country can be called upon by its respective state governor in the event of an emergency. High levels of National Guard deployment since 2001 have left some governors with only state police units to maintain security and facilitate emergency response. In the District of Columbia, only the President of the United States can call out the National Guard, leaving the D.C. government with little means of response in the case of an emergency regardless of National Guard deployment. The establishment of a D.C. Defense Force would fill this gap.

The District of Columbia cannot afford to sideline this national security asset. State Defense Forces are a proven force in homeland security and emergency response efforts. After 9/11, the New York Guard, New York Naval Militia, and New Jersey Naval Militia were activated. Additionally, after Hurricane Katrina, an estimated 2,274 State Defense Force personnel from at least eight states responded to support recovery efforts. Their state-apportioned status, organizational structure, and low-cost burden make these modern militias a vital and practical resource for the states and the District of Columbia.

In summation, a D.C. defense force will unquestionably improve the security of the District, particularly in an emergency situation, and will do so at minimal cost to taxpayers. Thank you again for the opportunity to address this issue before the Council.

http://www.heritage.org/Research/Testimony/2011/03/Improving-the-Security-of-the-District-of-Columbia-with-a-DC-Defense-Force

New Hampshire Looks at Creating a State Guard II

2011-03-10T22:00:00.000-08:00

There has been significant opposition to the creation of a New Hampshire State Defense Force in the New Hampshire state Assembly, primarily from "liberals". Their main objection seems
to be a perception that either the state of New Hampshire is most unlikely to be invaded, or that so called "tin foil hat" type "militia" will join and take the defense force over.

While it must be admitted that the last time New Hampshire faced invasion was the War of 1812, that has no bearing on current international conditions. With the various state National Guards seeing repeated long term deployments to the Middle East, increased threats from terrorists and probable hostile and organized military groups from Central and South America, I, for one, would not make a 25 year bet against military violence on our soil.

As for the 'Tin Foil Hat" folks, I don't see most them being able to organize themselves, much less take over a state government agency.

Is there another reason for this opposition that I have missed?

New Hampshire Looks at Creating a State Guard

2011-02-12T06:40:00.000-08:00

http://www.nhliberty.org/bills/view/2011/HB343

State Defense Force website.

2011-02-07T00:04:00.000-08:00

http://statedefenseforce.com/

facebook link:

http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=111719192175193

_____________________________________________________________

H.R. 206: Proposed legislation the provide for more effective state defense forces:

http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-206

StateGuard Forces from a Federal Perspective

2011-02-05T18:50:00.000-08:00

http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/Parameters/Articles/03winter/tulak.htm

State Defense Forces and
Homeland Security

ARTHUR N. TULAK, ROBERT W. KRAFT,
and DON SILBAUGH

From Parameters, Winter 2003-04, pp. 132-46.

As US Northern Command (NORTHCOM) assumes responsibility within the Department of Defense for the homeland security and homeland defense missions, it does so with few assigned forces. While the “Forces For” apportionment to NORTHCOM is still being finalized, they will in any case be meager in comparison to the scope of the task and the assigned area of responsibility. The paucity of forces available to NORTHCOM will require more economical approaches to force-building for contingency operations in support of homeland security missions. While the National Guard is ideally positioned and suited for homeland security, it may not always be available in adequate numbers if called to active federal duty in support of military operations overseas. In addition to the forces the National Guard may provide, State Defense Forces¹—military forces created, funded, and controlled solely by the individual states, and already integrated into the emergency management operations of more than 20 states—are a potential force-provider for homeland security operations.

NORTHCOM finds itself in a position familiar to the other regional combatant commands in that it must interact with the numerous sovereign nations in its area of responsibility and develop appropriate Theater Security Cooperation Plans (TSCP). The NORTHCOM area of responsibility encompasses Mexico, Canada, the Caribbean nations, and the European possessions in the Caribbean. NORTHCOM also has responsibility for the territories of Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands, and for the 49 US states on the North American continent. In this respect, the individual states are somewhat like the sovereign nations, in that each state or territorial government controls certain military forces and other pertinent manpower resources within its boundaries.² Just as NORTHCOM must develop a TSCP for the sovereign nations in

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its area of responsibility, so must it develop security cooperation plans for homeland security contingency operations with each of the US states and territories in its area.

Friendly forces available to NORTHCOM to conduct its homeland security mission—principally the National Guard elements—largely belong to the state governors, with the military components under the control of the state’s Adjutant General (AG).³ In 28 states, the AGs are also the directors of the state’s emergency management agency or directorate, with control over all emergency management components, both civilian and military.⁴ Within the military departments of 23 states and the Territory of Puerto Rico are the additional State Defense Forces (SDFs), which, like the state or territorial National Guard, are under the command of the governor through the Adjutant General. Thus SDFs constitute a third tier of military forces (the first two are federal forces, both active and reserve, and the dual-status National Guard forces, which may be either under federal or state control).

State Defense Forces, controlled and funded by the state or territory, are composed of volunteers who are paid only when called to state active duty by the governor. Nearly half of the governors have standing SDFs, while all the remaining states have the authority to raise such forces. It is therefore important for the NORTHCOM staff to understand State Defense Force capabilities and limitations, and to keep in mind appropriate roles and missions for these forces as they work through the state AGs to develop contingency plans for the next terrorist attack or disaster. According to the United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, chaired by former Senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman, such an attack is most likely to occur when the United States is involved in a conflict overseas, in which the National Guard units of a state may be employed, making the potential contributions of the State Defense Forces all the more significant.⁵

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State Defense Forces include both land and naval elements and are state-controlled military forces that may not be called to federal service. Five states—Alaska, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, and Wisconsin—have as part of their state military forces a State Naval Militia, similarly administered by their State Military Department.⁶ SDFs vary in size, composition, assigned missions, and capabilities, but all share a responsibility to provide the state with capabilities to respond to disasters, both natural and man-made, including terrorist attacks or subversive acts.⁷ SDFs can enhance homeland security effectiveness and should therefore be integrated into NORTHCOM’s planning and preparation for homeland security operations.

Homeland security may be generally classified as preventive measures to deter attacks against the nation, and consequence and crisis management to deal with the aftermath of a terrorist or subversive attack.⁸ SDFs can play an important role in enhancing the ability of the state through planning, coordination, and rehearsals during times of normalcy in order to bring effective organizations and their capabilities to bear in times of crisis.

Relying on States and Localities for Initial Response

The national homeland security strategy assigns to the states and localities the “primary responsibility for funding, preparing, and operating the emergency services in the event of a terrorist attack.”⁹ In the wake of the 11 September 2001 attacks, General William F. Kernan, then Commander of Joint Forces Command, outlined the role of the military in homeland security and proposed an order of response to domestic emergencies “that starts with the first-responders, then the National Guard, and finally the reserves and active components.”¹⁰ Unfortunately, the first-responder civilian forces under gubernatorial control are largely nonstandard from state to state, employ varying procedures, are organized according to the preferences of the local and state governments, and in most cases cannot communicate effectively intrastate, let alone interstate.¹¹ As the Hart-Rudman report notes, for example, “With few exceptions, first-responder commanders do not have access to secure radios, telephones, or video conferencing capabilities that can support communications with county, state, and federal emergency preparedness officials or National Guard leaders.”¹²

The variances of local and state first-responder organizational structures, procedures, communications architectures, and interoperability levels across the nation will impose organizational limitations on NORTHCOM planners as they develop contingency plans for military support. Such variances will require the identification of technological and procedural bridges and capabilities within each state and territory that will enable command, control, and communications, and which will permit some degree of stan-

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dardization in NORTHCOM plans for contingency support. The scale of planning required of NORTHCOM is significant considering that before the terrorist strikes on 9/11, only four states had contingency plans in place to respond to a significant terrorist attack.¹³

SDFs and the National Guard comprise the state military forces available to the governor in this order of response, following the municipal and county first-responders to the scene of an attack or disaster. SDFs represent a significant potential at the state level for providing trained personnel who can easily integrate with active and reserve component military forces in times of crisis, particularly since they share a similar culture, rank structure, organization, and regulatory procedures.¹⁴ Since SDFs are not required to train for a combat role to support the Army or Navy, they can focus exclusively on homeland security tasks in support of their state or territorial governor—an option not available to the Air and Army National Guard forces, which must train for their combat roles in the event they are called into service for the nation. The law authorizing the states and any territory, as well as Washington, D.C., to form and maintain state military forces (Title 32, US Code, section 109[c]), specifies that such forces “may not be called, ordered, or drafted into the armed forces,”¹⁵ and as such remain under state or territorial control.

With the significant reduction in forces in the active components since the end of the Cold War, the nation is now markedly more reliant on reserve component forces to conduct operations abroad in fulfilling its foreign policy. Indeed, the increased reliance on reserve and National Guard forces dates back to the end of the Vietnam War, but has become more pronounced in the past decade. The National Guard is unique among these reserve component forces in that it may be considered a dual-apportioned force, that is, a force included in more than one combatant command, as these units have both state and federal missions. National Guard units are included in the war plans of every combatant command. Furthermore, National Guard units have been activated and deployed intact, up to the division level, to conduct peacekeep-

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ing operations as part of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia¹⁶ and the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai.

When the United States has to fight a major theater war, the reserve components have to be called up in substantial numbers just to fill the force requirements for that theater and to ensure preparedness to deal with a possible second front. That leaves the state governors with fewer options to deal with the consequence management aspects of natural disasters and terrorist attacks, and to provide the required response to increased levels of readiness necessitated by a change in the National Alert System. Additionally, the recent experience of state governments with reserve component mobilization shows that it significantly depletes the ranks of first-responders, since police, firefighters, and emergency service personnel are often members of the reserve forces.¹⁷ Recognizing these challenges, the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, chaired by James Gilmore, recommended to the Secretary of Defense that NORTHCOM develop “plans across the full spectrum of potential activities to provide military support to civil authorities, including circumstances when other national assets are fully engaged or otherwise unable to respond, or when the mission requires additional or different military support.”¹⁸

This change in the paradigm of how the nation has viewed its internal security situation militarily has resulted in a dramatic change of focus for the Department of Defense, which is studying intently the question of how to provide support to civil authorities to enhance their homeland security posture and capabilities while fighting the global war on terror abroad in multiple theaters of operations. This shift has also resulted in a change of mission for the State Defense Forces, which are now focusing more than ever on how to support the state to protect its citizens from threats to the homeland such as terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. Given the dual-apportioned character of the National Guard, some see the State Defense Forces as the ultimate guarantor to the states and territories to handle state-specific missions in the event the National Guard is federalized.¹⁹

Role of the Militia in Homeland Security

As President Bush has pointed out, “The National Guard and reservists will be more involved in homeland security, confronting acts of terror and the disorder our enemies may try to create.”²⁰ Recognition of the increased role of the militia—the National Guard and State Defense Forces—in homeland security was also clear in the reports of two advisory panels of experts convened to review preparations for homeland security, the Hart-Rudman Commission and the Gilmore Panel, both of which recommended

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that the National Guard take on homeland security as its primary mission and be reorganized, trained, and equipped for such tasks. The Gilmore Panel recommended further that certain National Guard units be designated, trained, and equipped for homeland security “as their exclusive missions.”²¹ Two private associations, the National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS) and the Association of the United States Army (AUSA), both oppose this idea. The NGAUS argues that while National Guard units could perform homeland security roles, their primary purpose is to remain interoperable with the Army in order to be employed in regional contingencies, and their training and organization should reflect that purpose.²² State Defense Forces, on the other hand, have no combat mission and may focus exclusively on homeland security.

Both the Hart-Rudman Commission and the Gilmore Panel argued that homeland security demands specialized training and recommended that the Secretary of Defense require units to undergo such training. Both panels noted that while the National Guard will comprise the bulk of forces provided to NORTHCOM in the event of a crisis, those forces “will most likely be trained for warfighting, not necessarily for homeland defense or civil support missions.”²³

State Defense Forces, on the other hand, encourage specialization in emergency management training for units and leaders. Many SDF personnel are certified for emergency management and planning through courses offered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and its Emergency Management Institute.²⁴ The SDFs place great importance on this specialized skill set, and certification in emergency management training is often a prerequisite for duty in the state Emergency Operations Center and for promotion. The State Guard Association of the United States (SGAUS) offers a Military Emergency Management Specialist badge to SDF personnel who have completed this training, providing a national standard of competence.²⁵ Having such highly specialized and qualified personnel available to serve in the state Emergency Operations Center provides a vital procedural bridge between the military forces, local first-responders, and state and federal agencies responding to the crisis, as they can operate effectively in both military and civilian environments.

In the event of a crisis or terrorist attack, states and localities will respond with their available military and civilian assets in accordance with their emergency management plans. When circumstances pose military requirements that exceed the capabilities of the National Guard and State Defense Forces, the governor may appeal for federal assistance. The introduction of federal military forces does not require the federalization of the National Guard, unless the task is specifically a part of homeland defense, in

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which case these state military forces would be integrated into the military chain of command under Title 10 of US Code to defend against aggression. State Defense Forces, on the other hand, “may not be controlled or commanded by federal authorities, and missions are identified only by appropriate state officials, [i.e.] the State Adjutant General . . . [who] is not considered a federal authority.”²⁶ The lead federal agencies for crisis management and consequence management are the Federal Bureau of Investigation and FEMA, respectively.²⁷ NORTHCOM will likely provide support to these lead federal civilian agencies through Joint Force Headquarters – Homeland Security (JFHQ HLS) or its subordinate Joint Task Force – Civil Support (JTF-CS).²⁸

If the emergency prompting the employment of state military forces is declared a disaster at the federal level, then state National Guard soldiers may transition from a state active duty status to a Title 32 status, which is federally funded, nonfederal duty status, to perform state duty. State Defense Forces would remain in state active duty status in any case. Only in the case of a declaration of martial law or in the execution of homeland defense operations against an aggressor would State Defense Forces conceivably be under the direct control of the federal military.²⁹

As previously noted, the state Adjutant General is frequently the senior official in the state responsible for emergency management and will run the state Emergency Operations Center during a crisis, after a natural disaster, or in the aftermath of a terrorist attack. In those states where the AG is not the director of the state emergency management agency or directorate, he is often the governor’s primary adviser for military emergency response.³⁰ Since the AGs and the state military headquarters (State Area Command, or STARC) do not mobilize for war, they should be viewed as available for the homeland security mission.³¹ At the state level, the AGs have responsibility for consequence management preparations as part of the state’s emergency response plan, and are responsible for “supporting community readiness exercises designed to test local planning and preparation.”³²

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During a crisis in which state military forces are employed, the AGs will command and control state military forces, and conduct operations through the STARC headquarters. Below the STARC are the unit armories and subordinate brigade headquarters distributed throughout the state or territory through which the Adjutant General extends his command and control to assigned National Guard and State Defense Force units. This ready-made command and control system in the STARC and supporting facilities available to the Adjutant General, as well as the unique federal/state status of the National Guard and the state status of the State Defense Forces, uniquely qualifies this structure to serve as NORTHCOM’s primary force provider of military support to local first-responders and civilian authorities.³³

State military forces under the control of the Adjutant General may assist neighboring states in responding to natural disasters and homeland security mission where bilateral agreements exist.³⁴ This is made possible through the national standardization of tactics, techniques, and procedures, as well as organizational culture, rank structure, and unit organization, all of which greatly facilitate effective integration with federal military units, as well as with state forces in other states.³⁵ The procedures, culture, and training of National Guard soldiers and units, to which the SDFs adhere, are common across the nation, and provide a framework for standardized models of command and control for NORTHCOM contingency planning at the state level.³⁶ Both the newly created Department of Homeland Security and NORTHCOM can work through the AGs to coordinate state contingency planning for homeland security missions employing state military forces.

Procedures for federal command and control of state military forces have evolved through such civil support operations as the support for the Olympic games in 1996 and 2002. In providing support to the 1996 Olympic games, the US Army (then designated as the DOD executive agent) used the First US Army as the controlling headquarters under which it formed a Response Task Force (RTF) headquarters. The RTF headquarters, which directed all military support operations, was “designed specifically to work with federal, state, and local civilian officials supporting the event.”³⁷ In this operation, the Army operated with parallel chains of command for federal and state military forces.³⁸

For the 2002 Olympic games in Salt Lake City, DOD formed the Combined Joint Task Force – Olympics (CJTF-O). To facilitate tactical direction of state military forces, a series of memorandums of agreement was completed between the various state AGs, CJTF-O, US Joint Forces Command, and the National Guard Bureau, which gave the CJTF-O Commander “tasking authority” over the Title 32 forces in his area of operations.³⁹ The memorandums of agreement developed with the AGs of 11 states for CJTF-O

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provide a solid model for homeland security contingency planning. NORTHCOM’s JFHQ-HLS could employ this approach for using state military forces on state status under the tactical direction of a Title 10 Joint Task Force commander.⁴⁰ Using this model would mean that NORTHCOM’s JFHQ-HLS would not “command” the state’s National Guard forces called to active duty by the governor, nor its SDFs. Rather, the result would be a combined organization achieving unity of effort via tasking authority through the state Adjutant General.

Expanding the Role of State Defense Forces

SDFs participate in the planning and preparation for state responses to natural disasters and terrorist attacks, and they participate in joint and interagency exercises to be ready for such contingencies. Tasks supporting homeland security constitute the raison d’�tre for SDFs and drive the development of their mission-essential task list. Through their AGs, governors set State Defense Force missions and provide the resources needed to enable them to accomplish those missions.

The primary contributions SDFs offer to NORTHCOM lie in providing personnel specialized in emergency management to support contingency planning, preparation, and coordination, and to operate the command, control, and communications (C3) facilities set up in response to crises. SDF personnel man duty stations in the state Emergency Operations Centers and state Joint Operations Centers, and SDFs are capable of providing C3 facilities and headquarters in the field. Most SDFs provide manning at fixed C3 facilities, but some also have the ability to man mobile command posts.

Probably the ultimate example of the contributions in the arena of mobile C3 capabilities that SDFs can offer is found in the South Carolina State Guard, which operates the South Carolina Emergency Communications Vehicle (ECV). The ECV is a state-of-the-art vehicle which provides the technological bridges and communications—including satellite communications—to link together the various C3 systems used by the local first-responder forces, state and federal emergency management agencies, and the

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military command post. The ECV provides short-term emergency telephone and radio dispatch capability in a forward disaster area.

SDFs have a long history of service to their states, including many recent examples relevant to today’s threat conditions.⁴¹ Over the past two decades, SDFs have been called to state active duty in support of several environmental disasters and terrorist attacks, including the following: the Exxon Valdez oil spill recovery operation in 1989 (Alaska Naval Militia); tornados in Tennessee in 1993 (Tennessee State Guard); the TWA Flight 800 crash into New York Harbor in 1996 (New York Guard and Naval Militia); winter storms that same year (New York Guard, Virginia State Defense Force, Oregon State Defense Force, and Maryland Defense Force); the 2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center (New York Guard, Naval Militia, and New Jersey Naval Militia);⁴² and as part of Operation Noble Eagle, the coastal patrol and maritime homeland security operation around the United States, including critical infrastructure protection of the Alaskan oil pipeline (Alaska State Defense Force).⁴³

A superb example of how state military forces are already integrated into the consequence management aspects of homeland security in states where they serve can be seen in the actions of the New Jersey Naval Militia in response to the 2001 World Trade Center attack. After the terrorists struck, the New Jersey Naval Militia’s Disaster Medical Assistance Team and Chaplain Corps were both mobilized at Staten Island, New York, to assist survivors and rescue workers in support of Task Force Respect, while other Naval Guardsman transported some of the evidence collected from Ground Zero to Manhattan’s Chelsea Pier and Staten Island.⁴⁴ New Jersey Naval Militia also were activated to participate in Operation Noble Eagle, with the Naval Guardsmen taking on a multitude of tasks. They provided 24-hour staffing for the New Jersey National Guard’s Joint Operations Center at Fort Dix, New Jersey; provided boat crews to support the rescue and recovery efforts in New York City with ferry services across the Hudson River; provided the water-borne security which allowed for the opening of the George Washington Bridge; relieved State Marine Police crews; and provided waterborne security for New Jersey’s nuclear power plants. They also augmented the US Navy’s waterborne security forces at US Naval Weapons Station Earle, where boats crewed by Naval Militia sailors performed picket boat duty to patrol the security zone, helping to protect US Navy and Coast Guard ships while munitions were being loaded.⁴⁵

Our focus thus far has been on the land and naval components of State Defense Forces. Obviously, to conduct homeland security operations, a governor may also call to state duty the Air National Guard with its wide range of transport, reconnaissance, and fighter capabilities. However, like

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their land component counterparts, units of the various state Air National Guards are earmarked for combat operations and are included in the war plans for the regional combatant commands. Consequently they may not be available to the states when needed. Alaska, New York, Texas, and Virginia have SDFs with air components,⁴⁶ but there are other aerial forces NORTHCOM can call upon for homeland security operations in the event that the Air National Guard forces are not available in times of crisis, and where the SDF lacks its own aviation component. NORTHCOM also can draw upon the resources of the Civil Air Patrol and, in some cases, the aviation elements of the US Coast Guard Auxiliary.

While not an organ of any state, the Civil Air Patrol, the congressionally designated civilian auxiliary to the US Air Force, is already integrated into state emergency management operations in each of the 50 states, Washington, D.C., and the territories of the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico. The Civil Air Patrol “through its emergency services program, maintains the capability to meet requests of the Air Force and assist federal, state, and local agencies . . . [with] aircraft, vehicles, communications equipment, and a force of trained volunteers for response to natural and man-made disasters or national emergencies.”⁴⁷ Among the missions the Civil Air Patrol can perform in support of homeland security is the task to “man designated positions at state and local communications and emergency operations centers.”⁴⁸ This means that NORTHCOM will likely encounter Civil Air Patrol personnel at the various state Emergency Operations Centers during crisis response operations. Accordingly, the Civil Air Patrol and its capabilities should be considered as one of the aviation components available to NORTHCOM as it works with states to develop contingency plans for homeland security contingencies.

Conclusion

State Defense Forces are already integrated at the state level in the emergency management and consequence management plans of the several states and territories that maintain such forces. Given the dual-apportioned character of the National Guard to fulfill both its federal mission in support of the National Military Strategy and its state missions of civil support and disaster assistance, SDFs represent a valuable additional component for homeland security and homeland defense contingency planning and operations. State Defense Forces can provide a pool of specially trained personnel to assist in homeland security planning and command and control. State Defense Forces can provide key technological and procedural bridges to link NORTHCOM to local first-responders and state and federal agencies during

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operations. As NORTHCOM continues to develop its operating picture and establish contacts and working arrangements with the State Area Commands and AGs, it will find itself working with State Defense Force personnel. Since NORTHCOM will be looking to the states and territories for first-responders and initial forces, it is important that its planning staff consider State Defense Forces and integrate them into contingency planning for regional and state responses for homeland security. NORTHCOM should ensure that future contingency planning efforts for homeland security operations fully incorporate the valuable capabilities that State Defense Forces can provide.

NOTES

1. State Defense Force is a generic term. The actual title is the prerogative of the individual state. See National Guard Regulation 10-4, Organizations and Functions: State Defense Forces, National Guard Bureau, and State National Guard Interaction (Washington: US Department of the Army, 21 September 1987), p. 2. SDFs also have been described as “Home Guards” and “Home Defense Forces” and, depending on the state, are officially known as National Guard Reserves, State Military Reserves, State Guards, State Military Forces, Militia, and Naval Militia. The term Home Guard was used in reference to the organized State Defense Forces of several states during World War I, many of which had the term in their official name. See Barry M. Stentiford, The American Home Guard: The State Militia in the Twentieth Century (College Station: Texas A&M Univ. Press, 2002), p. xi. The term also was used to describe the organized auxiliary “Local Defence Volunteers,” established in May 1940 and employed for the defense of Great Britain during World War II. Today, the term is used only for purposes of comparison of present-day SDFs to their earlier American manifestations and foreign counterparts. See George J. Stein, “State Defense Forces: The Missing Link in National Security,” Military Review, 64 (September 1984), 3-4. A list of SDFs includes the following:

Alabama State Defense Force, http://www.alsdf.org

Alaska State Defense Force, http://www.ak-prepared.com/asdf

California State Military Reserve, http://www.militarymuseum.org/CASMR.html

Connecticut State Militia, http://www.ct.ngb.army.mil/militia/militia.asp

Georgia State Defense Force, http://www.dod.state.ga.us/SDF/

Indiana Guard Reserve, http://go.to/igr

Louisiana State Guard

Maryland Defense Force, http://www.mddefenseforce.org/

Massachusetts Military Reserve

Michigan Emergency Volunteers

Mississippi State Guard, http://groups.msn.com/MississippiStateGuard/

New Jersey Naval Militia, http://www.njnavy.com/; and New Jersey Army State Guard

New Mexico State Defense Force

New York Guard and New York Naval Militia, http://www.dmna.state.ny.us/

Ohio Military Reserve, http://www.ohio.gov/ohmr/; Ohio Naval Militia, http://www.sgaus.org/hist_onm.htm

Oregon State Defense Force, http://www.mil.state.or.us/SDF/index.html

Puerto Rico State Guard

South Carolina State Guard, http://www.scsg.org/

Tennessee State Guard, http://home.att.net/~dcannon.tenn/TNSG.html

Texas State Guard, http://www.agd.state.tx.us/agdmain/state/stateindexframe.htm

Virginia Defense Force, http://www.virginiadefenseforce.org/home

Washington State Guard, http://www.washingtonguard.com/State_Guard/

2. The White House, Unified Command Plan (Unclassified, Secret Appendix Detached), 30 April 2002, with Change 1, 30 July 2002, p. 7.

3. In Rhode Island and the District of Columbia, the position is known as the “Commanding General,” but has the same functions.

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4. Michael Doubler, “Guarding The Homeland: The Army National Guard and Homeland Security,” A Role of American Military Power Monograph, Association of the United States Army, Arlington, Va., December 2002, p. 31. See also Bruce M. Lawlor, “Military Support of Civil Authorities—A New Focus for a New Millennium,” p. 6, http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/articles/Lawlor.htm.

5. The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, Gary Hart and Warren Rudman Co-Chairmen, Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change (Washington: GPO, 31 January 2001), p. 25, hereinafter cited as the Hart-Rudman Report.

6. California also has established a Naval Militia, but has not yet manned the organization. For a history and descriptions of naval militia forces, see W. D. McGlasson, “Naval Militia,” in National Guard Magazine, November 1984, pp. 12-14, 39. For recent examples of naval militia, see Naval Mobile Construction Battalion Twenty-Seven (NMCB 27), “NMCB 27 Hosts Naval Reserve Center Conference at Naval Air Station Brunswick,” http://www.seabee.navy.mil/nmcb27/news_01-03_hosts_naval_reserve_cent.htm.

7. SDFs vary widely in size. The smallest is Michigan’s, which is currently under reorganization and has a cadre of 15 members, while New York and Puerto Rico have very large SDFs, the latter having over 1,500 members. See Roger Brown, William Fedorochko, and J. Schank, RAND Research Report MR-557-OSD, “Assessing the State and Federal Missions of the National Guard,” study sponsored by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs and available at http://www.rand.org.

8. Homeland security and homeland defense are defined in a memorandum from General Richard B. Myers, Subject: “Terms of Reference for Establishing NORTHCOM,” Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, not dated, as follows. Homeland security is: “The preparation for, prevention of, deterrence of, preemption of, defense against, and response to threats and aggression directed towards US territory, sovereignty, domestic population, and infrastructure; as well as crisis management, consequence management, and other domestic civil support.” Homeland defense is: “The protection of US territory, sovereignty, domestic population, and critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression.”

State Defense Forces are defined as follows in the National Guard Bureau Fact Sheet, “National Guard and Militias,” at http://www.ngb.army.mil/downloads/fact_sheets/doc/militias_word.doc: “The State Defense Force is a form of militia and is authorized to the states by federal statute (Title 32 U.S. � 109). State Defense Forces are not entities of the federal government. They are organized, equipped, trained, employed and funded according to state laws and are under the exclusive jurisdiction of the governor. Should the National Guard be mobilized for war, specialized operations such as humanitarian or peacekeeping missions or called into federal service during national emergencies, the State Defense Force will assume the National Guard’s mission for the state’s security.” SDFs, along with the state National Guard, comprise the state militia, but unlike the National Guard, cannot be federalized and remain under state control.

9. The White House, Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington: GPO, July 2002), p. viii.

10. See John R. Brinkerhoff, “The Changing of the Guard: Evolutionary Alternatives for America’s National Guard,” Journal of Homeland Security, May 2002, http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/articles/Brinkerhoff_guard.html. Brinkerhoff, p. 5, cites General William F. Kernan, address to the Fletcher Conference, “The Military’s Role in Homeland Security,” 15 November 2001, Defenselink, JFCOM website.

11. “First-responders” are primarily local organizations, such as law enforcement, emergency medical personnel, fire departments, and emergency crews from the transportation and communications industries. See Don Edwards and Richard Dunn, “The National Guard’s Enhanced Role in Homeland Security,” Journal of Homeland Security, March 2001, http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/articles/Edwards_Dunn.htm.

12. Hart-Rudman Report, p. 14.

13. Phil Bossert, “Improving the Effectiveness of First Responders in Homeland Security,” research report, Air War College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, November 2002.

14. All SDFs are under the purview of the National Guard Bureau, which is the designated executive agent within the Defense Department for providing administrative, procedural, and organizational guidance to the SDFs through the states’ Adjutants General.

15. Excerpts from the US Code are accessible at the website of the Virginia State Defense Force, http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-binlegp504.exe?000+cod+44-1.

16. Most recently, the 28th Infantry Division from Pennsylvania sent 3,100 soldiers on 16 September 2002, and is currently providing the bulk of US forces for this operation. See Doubler, p. 26.

17. Faye Flore, “Showdown With Iraq: Buildup Strains Public Safety; As the Pentagon Deploys More Reservists Overseas, Police and Fire Officials Face the Loss of Key Personnel at a Time of Heightened Threat,” Los Angeles Times, 17 February 2003, part 1, p. 1.

18. Fourth Annual Report to the President and the Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, James Gilmore, Chairman, 15 December 2002, http://www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel/terror4txt.pdf. Emphasis in original. Hereinafter cited as the Gilmore Panel Report.

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19. See, e.g., Brinkerhoff, “The Changing of the Guard.” See also an open letter to Governor Thomas Ridge from Brigadier General Hall Worthington, President of the State Guard Association of the United States, 14 November 2001, http://www.sgaus.org/volunteers2.htm.

20. George W. Bush, 14 February 2001, Remarks by the President to National Guard Personnel, Yeager Field, Charleston, W.Va., http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/02/20010214-2.html.

21. Hart-Rudman Report, p. 24; Gilmore Panel Report, p. xi.

22. Doubler, pp. 18-19, cites National Guard Bureau, Annual Review, 2000, p. 31; US Joint Forces Command, Joint Task Force Civil Support, “JTF-CS Fact Sheet,” n.d., p. 1; and National Guard, February 2001, p. 10.

23. Gilmore Panel Report, p. 95.

24. For a list of courses, see the FEMA Emergency Management Institute website, http://www.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/crslist.asp.

25. See the SGAUS Education Committee Military Emergency Management Specialist program at http://www.sgaus.org/MEMSAppli.htm.

26. National Guard Regulation 10-4, p. 3.

27. Lawrence L. Randle, “Integrating Versus Merging of the Guard and Reserve: Should the United States Continue to Maintain Duplicate Federal and State Military Forces?” Strategy Research Project, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., June 2002, p. 14.

28. FEMA provides civilian oversight of military operations during consequence management operations. See Ted Smits, Terri Wilcox, and A. J. Heino, “Limiting the Military’s Involvement in Homeland Defense,” student research paper, Joint Forces Staff College, Joint and Combined Staff Officer School, 8 June 2001, p. 4.

29. Ronald R. Armstrong and Alexander Philip Gisoldi, “State Defense Forces: Past, Present, and Future,” master’s thesis, California State University, Sacramento, Calif., 1989, p. 21. See also Trevor N. Dupuy, et al., “U.S. Home Defense Forces Study,” prepared for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Dunn Loring, Va., March 1981, p. 3.

30. Michael P. Fleming, “National Security Roles for the National Guard,” Journal of Homeland Security, August 2001, p. 8, http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/articles/Fleming.htm.

31. John R. Brinkerhoff, “Restore the Militia for Homeland Security,” Journal of Homeland Security, November 2001, p. 8, http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/articles/Brinkerhoff_Nov01.htm.

32. Fleming, p. 6.

33. Jack Spencer and Larry M. Wortzel, “The Role of the National Guard in Homeland Security,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1532, April 2002, p. 6.

34. Stentiford, p. 56, provides examples of SDFs operating outside their state boundaries and even in Canada during World War I. Dupuy et al., p. B-2, discusses SDFs operating outside state borders either in “hot pursuit” or at the direction of the governor and at the request of the neighboring state.

35. Randall J. Larsen and Ruth A. David, “Homeland Defense: Assumptions First, Strategy Second,” Strategic Review, 28 (Fall 2000), 4-10, http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/articles/article1.htm.

36. National Guard Regulation 10-4 governs all SDFs.

37. Lawlor.

38. Alan D. Preisser, “Understanding Authorities in National Special Security Events,” Joint Center for Lessons Learned Quarterly Bulletin, 5 (September 2002), 2.

39. Ibid.

40. Charlene Eastman, “Joint Task Force – Olympics 2002,” Joint Center for Lessons Learned Quarterly Bulletin, 5 (September 2002), 6. See also, D. Fox, R. Hodgkins, and W. Peterson, “Challenges for NORTHCOM: Will CINCNORTH Have the Tools Required?” student paper, Joint Forces Staff College, Joint and Combined Warfighting School, 31 May 2002.

41. See Stentiford. SDFs served their states during both World Wars, the Korean War, and the Cold War. During World War II, 47 states had SDFs of substantial size and capabilities, including air, naval, and land forces. Present-day missions include the following:

Augment state Emergency Operations Centers under the state Emergency Management Agency.

Assume control of National Guard facilities and state properties in the event of a mobilization of the state National Guard.

Assist in the mobilization of the National Guard for state or federal duty.

Support the National Guard in providing family assistance to military dependents in the state in the event of mobilization.

Assist local and state law enforcement agencies in preserving law and order.

Under the control of the governor, cooperate with federal military authorities and forces engaged in active military operations or charged with internal security missions within the state. This particular mission is found in National Guard Regulation 10-4, p.3.

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Prepare to conduct the following tasks during natural disasters or civil disorders: civil disturbance control, search and rescue, evacuation of casualties, traffic control, VIP escort, and security.

Assist in the coordination of the highway movement of all Army convoys and federalized National Guard units within the state and operate traffic control points as required.

Augment shortages in National Guard units when activated to provide administrative, operations, and logistics personnel during states of emergency.

Operate Disaster Field Offices, Disaster Recovery Centers, Disaster Application Centers; provide preliminary disaster assessment, damage verifications; administer individual and family grant programs associated with disaster relief.

Support events designated as requiring national-level security (as determined by the President) such as the 1996 Olympics, the Super Bowl, etc.

Support youth programs such as the California Cadet Corps, a state-run junior high school cadet program much like the Army, Air Force, and Navy JROTC programs at the high school level.

Naval Militia tasks include:

Support the Coast Guard in the execution of naval and port interdiction of weapons of mass destruction and support for homeland security.

Support Marine Police and other law-enforcement agencies.

Respond to state emergencies resulting from natural or man-made disasters or events.

Provide the governor and Emergency Operations Center a naval off-shore command center.

Assist in evidence recovery (e.g., TWA Flight 800 that crashed into New York’s harbor, and recovery of evidence from the World Trade Center attack).

Perform rescue and recovery.

Provide ferry and transportation services.

Assist in waterborne security for critical infrastructure protection (e.g., nuclear power plants and bridges) as well as at Navy logistics and ammunition facilities.

Promote US naval history at the battleships, submarines, and other floating public museums of naval history.

Provide waterborne security for bridges, harbors, nuclear power plants, etc. against terror attacks.

Provide waterborne transportation for governmental agencies.

Provide waterborne security at military sites adjacent to waterfronts.

Support the Coast Guard in law enforcement duties.

Support youth programs such as Naval JROTC.

42. For a more detailed description of SDFs in several of these operations, see State Guard Association of the United States, “Our Best Kept Secrets,” SGAUS Journal, http://sgaus.org/bkept.htm.

43. Martha Bellisle, “State Checks Dalton Traffic,” Anchorage Daily News, 31 October 2001, p. A-1.

44. Steve Mannion, “Reviving the United States Naval Militia,” unpublished paper, January 2003, p. 2.

45. Ibid.

46. E-mail correspondence with Captain Gene Romanick, New Jersey State Guard (Naval), 27 February 2003, and Lieutenant (JG) Steve Mannion, New Jersey State Guard (Naval), 26 February 2003.

47. HQ CAP-USAF XO and HQ CAP DO, Civil Air Patrol Support for the President’s National Strategy for Homeland Security, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 2002, p. 2. As that document notes, p. 8, Civil Air Patrol (CAP) capabilities include the following:

Provide airborne communications relay platforms so law enforcement personnel on the ground or in low-flying aircraft can communicate with the task force leader or mission base.

Upload pictures taken during airborne reconnaissance on a limited access website for law enforcement agencies.

Deploy airborne and ground search and rescue teams to assist in disaster response and recovery efforts.

Employ a limited radiological monitoring capability. Airborne and ground platforms could be equipped with sensor equipment to support the initiative to detect chemical and biological materials and attacks.

Examples of recent operations in support of homeland security:

“At the request of the Governor of New York, on [12 September 2001] CAP provided the first direct perspective of the World Trade Center disaster site. The photographs the aircrew provided were of immediate value to rescue and security personnel at Ground Zero. . . .

“564 hours were flown in support of 9/11.

“450 CAP members manned their designated positions at the FEMA Region Operations Centers and State Emergency Operations Centers.

“NY Wing CAP stepped up existing New York City watershed reservoir reconnaissance. . . .

“CAP personnel from the Northeast Region provided communications and coordination support to the FEMA Region 1 Regional Operations Center.”

48. Ibid., p. 1.

Lieutenant Colonel Arthur N. Tulak, USA, is assigned to the J-39 Information Operations Cell at Pacific Command Headquarters, Camp Smith, Hawaii. His previous assignment was as the Division Information Operations Officer for the 82d Airborne Division in Bagram, Afghanistan, and his earlier assignments included tours with the 87th, 8th, 27th, and 29th Infantry Regiments.

Lieutenant Commander Robert W. Kraft, USN, is the staff intelligence officer with Carrier Air Wing Seven. He was previously assigned overseas in consecutive joint billets as the Chief of Target Development/Information Operations Targeting, Headquarters USEUCOM, and the Operations Officer at Joint Intelligence Center, USPACOM, Japan.

Major Donley Silbaugh, USAF, is a Ballistic Missile Defense Plans & Policy Officer (J-5B) for US Strategic Command, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado. His previous assignment was Chief, Space Control Stan/Eval for the 21st Operations Group at Peterson Air Force Base.

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Reviewed 24 November 2003. Please send comments or corrections to carl_Parameters@conus.army.mil

Virginia Again

2010-11-25T21:11:00.000-08:00

Credit: Courtesy Sgt. Michael Chen

New recruits for the Virginia Defense Force arrive for training.

By Bryan McKenzie
Published: November 25, 2010

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The Virginia Defense Force may lack the weapons, equipment and pay of a Virginia National Guard unit, but there’s no denying the volunteers’ desire to serve.

Members of the Charlottesville-based Charlie Company of the force’s 13th Battalion of the “Blackhorse” brigade are the state’s backup force to the National Guard. When the Guard is called up, the Blackhorse brigade is ready to ride in to take over whatever duties need to be filled, from communications and logistics to emergency response and management. They’re also available to do the basic tasks that allow more guardsmen to put boots on the ground.

But where the Guard gets federal equipment and training, the state force is pretty much on its own. The agency drills once each month, but not with weapons. It focuses on crowd control, traffic control and security checkpoints, communications and administrative duties.

The defense force is truly a local-level organization. They take their talents, augment them with training in emergency management and community emergency response, as well as Federal Emergency Management Agency courses, and apply them when possible.

“Everybody has a talent or a specialty and we try to utilize members based on what they can do,” said 1st. Lt. Randy Brooks, company commander for Charlie Company. “If someone has experience with computers or communications or is an emergency medical technician, we try to put those abilities and that knowledge to work.”

A well-regulated militia, according to the Constitution, is necessary to the security of a free state. Federal law defines the militia as “all able-bodied males at least 17 years of age and … under 45 years of age” who are, or plan to become, U.S. citizens. The militia also includes women who are members of the National Guard.

Federal law further divides the militia into unorganized — those not serving in any military capacity — and organized, including the National Guard and state-approved defense forces.

The last time the unorganized militia was called to active duty was by the Confederate States of America when the now-defunct government activated the “home guard.”

The state militias served in World War I and World War II when the federal government called on the state National Guards to fight in the wars.

Still, prior to 1973, the Virginia National Guard was pretty much a state-controlled, organized militia. It acted as an arm of law enforcement, security and relief when faced with flood, disaster and lawlessness within the state, except in times of dire national emergency.

That role changed when the federal military became all volunteer and federal rules were rewritten to include the Guard under federal purview. Federal laws later were passed to give the states the right to form their own military forces: Enter the Virginia Defense Force.

“The National Guard is considered the state’s defense force, but when the Guard is activated, our job is to be there to assure the state still has a defense force available,” Brooks said. “We’re a force-multiplier and get called up to work with the Guard in any capacity we can to help them in their mission in a state emergency.”

Statewide, the force includes four brigades, including three general-purpose brigades with members cross-trained in communications and other emergency responses. The force also has a fixed-wing aviation battalion with members supplying their own airplanes, a military police battalion, a medical battalion, a riverine battalion for patrolling the state’s rivers and a training battalion.

“The National Guard has a national focus and the defense force is state-focused,” said Col. Michael Lawson, of Troy. “If [smaller jurisdictions] had to deal with a major snowstorm or wildfire in the Blue Ridge, they could request our services from the governor and we would go in and help in whatever capacity needed, from communications at the emergency operations center to additional emergency medical personnel. Whatever they need.”

“We are strictly here for the state. We can’t be called up and sent overseas. Our function is strictly in the commonwealth, much like the National Guard used to be,” Brooks said. “We do a lot of community support at events like the Albemarle County Fair, where we’ll set up in the field, provide traffic control and security.”

They also recruit.

“That’s where they found me,” laughed Sgt. Michael Chen, Charlie Company’s non-commissioned officer. “My company, Line-X, had a booth at the Greene County Fair and we kept talking about it. I didn’t think I really had the time to commit to it because of running my business, but with a little bit of prodding I decided to give it a shot.”

Chen, 45, has embraced the defense force role. Like many members, he has augmented the company’s mission with personally purchased gear. He even purchased a used Hummer — the civilian version of a military high-mobility, multipurpose-wheeled vehicle, a HMMWV in military parlance and a Humvee in soldier slang — for personal use and for use with the agency, should the need arise.

The company drills once a month, much like the National Guard. Their uniforms are classic “BDU,” the uniform formerly worn by the military prior to Iraq and Afghanistan.

For Chen, who has no prior military service, serving in the defense force is meeting a social commitment.

“I’ve always had the thought in my mind that serving in the military was a good thing,” Chen said. “When I realized I did have the time and this was one way to serve, I decided to do it. The commitment is whatever time you can put into it and what you can do for as long as you want to,” Chen said. “If something happens and you can’t participate regularly, you can submit a letter of resignation.”

For Brooks, who previously served, it’s a response to the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.

“People were looking for a way to serve after 9/11 and, with age creeping up and bad knees, it pretty much prevented me from going back in [the active military],” he said. “This is a way to serve the community, the commonwealth and the country. I’ve never regretted joining and now my son is also serving. It’s the kind of thing that appeals to a lot of families and we have a lot of members sharing last names. We like it that way.”

“It’s kind of a big family, but there’s always room for more,” Chen laughed.

2010-10-24T21:25:00.000-07:00

James Jay Carafano: State Defense Forces provide professionalism on the cheap

By: James Carafano
Examiner Columnist (San Francisco)
October 24, 2010

In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, they came out by the thousands. They were some of the first on the scene and among the last to leave.

Call them "the forgotten responders." They got little press, and most Americans still don't know they even exist.

They are the State Defense Forces.

In Texas alone, more than 1,000 SDF members mobilized to assist in the Katrina recovery. They organized medical and military police units that received evacuees at Kelly Air Force Base and supported operations at the Houston Astrodome and at shelters in four other locations within Texas.

In Georgia, SDF volunteers processed evacuees through Dobbins Air Reserve Base and provided medical and administrative support and security for shelters.

From Virginia 100 came to aid in the Katrina response. Maryland sent an 81-person medical team to Louisiana. Tennessee activated 150 volunteers to secure and support shelter operations.

How could this be?

The U.S. Constitution allows states to raise and maintain state defense forces. As the emergency response to Hurricane Katrina demonstrated, these groups can be an important supplement to the National Guard, particularly during catastrophic disasters.

When trained, disciplined, and well organized, local responders are essential for providing immediate aid and security.

The private, self-proclaimed "militias" profiled in a recent issue of Time Magazine are a completely different animal. SDFs are authorized and managed by the states. Though they seldom make the headlines, they represent a combined force of 14,000.

They are scattered around the country. And they are absolutely critical to America's ability to respond to nationwide disasters.

Last week, representatives from the 23 states that have organized SDFs assembled in Albuquerque, N.M., for the annual conference of the State Guard Association of the United States. Frankly, they are not that formidable-looking.

You see a hodge-podge of uniforms, many grey-haired generals, and more than a few members who would have a hard time making it over the obstacle course. Outward appearance notwithstanding, this crew possesses a wealth of professionalism, experience and dedication.

We're talking Vietnam War veterans, Ph.D.s in clinical psychology, and emergency managers with decades of experience.

Unlike the National Guard, the SDFs receive no funding or support from the federal government. Most serve for no pay whatsoever.

The Heritage Foundation recently surveyed 13 states with SDFs and found only four paid SDF members -- even when they were serving on state-active duty to respond to disasters. They are truly volunteer citizen soldiers.

The survey also found that SDFs perform a variety of functions for different states. Some help the state National Guard in maintaining armories; others help out in the state emergency operations centers.

Some SDF members assist local law enforcement; some have their own naval and air arms, while others provide medical and communications support.

Whatever their duties, each member fills an important niche in protecting and serving the citizens of his or her state.

SDFs are a low-cost, high-payoff asset, yet many states do not maintain them. Judging by more than 50 years of actuarial data, states such as Arizona, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Missouri, North Carolina and Pennsylvania have a historically "high risk" of natural disasters. Yet none of those seven states has an SDF.

Washington, D.C., doesn't either. Some territories, such as Puerto Rico, do. Go figure.

With state coffers pressed for cash and homeland security grants likely to shrink in the years ahead, all states should be pursuing low-cost, high-yield, common-sense measures to ensure they'll be ready when disaster strikes. Establishing or expanding SDFs is a great way to go.

Examiner Columnist James Jay Carafano is a senior research fellow for national security at the Heritage Foundation.

New York Naval Militia

2010-10-23T00:13:00.001-07:00

The New York Naval Militia is the Naval Militia of New York State and is under the command of the Governor of New York.

With the New York State Guard, as well as the Army National Guard and Air National Guard, it is under the control of the New York Division of Military and Naval Affairs and New York's Adjutant General.

The New York Naval Militia was organized as a Provisional Naval Battalion in 1889 and was formally mustered into State service as the First Battalion, Naval Reserve Artillery, on 23 June 1891. One year later the New York Naval Militia was called to active duty to protect steam ship passengers during the 1892 cholera quarantine at Fire Island.

Following the sinking of USS Maine, the Navy Department called up Naval Militia volunteers for duty in the Federal Auxiliary Naval Force^{[citation needed]}. The Spanish American War had begun and the New York Naval Militia participated. New York Naval Militiamen manned two auxiliary cruisers that were engaged in the Battle of Santiago de Cuba and served aboard various other ships including patrol craft tasked with protecting New York Harbor.

During the early 1900s frequent attempts by Congress to create a National Naval Reserve failed. In 1914 however, Congress passed the Naval Militia Act which placed the State organizations under the supervision of the Navy Department.

The United States Navy Reserve was established in 1916. Only persons with prior Naval service could affiliate, leaving the Naval Militias as the only avenue for civilians to become citizen sailors. The National Defense Act of 1916 resulted in the creation of the National Naval Volunteers, which the New York Naval Militia joined en masse. The Naval Militia Marine Company was also formed in 1916. The Militia Marine Company was the first in the nation and predated the United States Marine Corps Reserve program by four months. In addition, the donation of a hydroplane marked the beginning of the Naval Reserve Aviation Program.

During the next 34 years, the New York Naval Militia (Naval volunteers/Navy and Marine Corps Reserves) were Federally mobilized for both World Wars and the Korean War. Beginning in the 1950s, many of the state militias began to disappear, but experienced a resurgence after the September 11, 2001 attacks.

At present, the New York Naval Militia has over 2,400 members, 95% of whom are also members of the U.S. Naval Reserve, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, or U.S. Coast Guard Reserves.

The New York Naval Militia is organized into three regional commands, Southern Command, Northern Command, and Western Command; and one operational command, the Military Emergency Boat Service (MEBS).

New York State Guard

2010-10-22T23:52:00.001-07:00

The New York Guard is a state volunteer force which augments and supports the New York National Guard as required with manpower and skills.

New York Guard members serve in an unpaid status unless they are placed on State Active Duty by the governor and they cannot be mobilized for federal duty. They assist the National Guard in planning, training for and executing state emergency support and disaster missions. And provide legal and medical pre-deployment assistance to the National Guard units and other reserve components as requested.

Many New York Guard members are retired members of the National Guard and other military services, however military experience is not a prerequisite to membership.

The New York Guard was born in World War I when the New York National Guard, a division’s worth of Soldiers, was mobilized; first for service on the Mexican border and then to fight in France. The New York Guard replaced the National Guard and served as a home guard, mounting guard on the New York City reservoirs.

Today members of the New York Guard assist National Guard Soldiers and Airmen to serve the people of New York as members of Guard Joint Task Forces. New York Guard members are part of the National Guard team trained to rescue people from destroyed buildings and decontaminate them, assist the National Guard in search and rescue when called upon, and even help National Guard units train to deploy at home or abroad.

The New York Guard experienced a resurgence after the September 11, 2001 attacks. New York Guard units were activated after the attacks, performing a variety of missions, including, logistical support to forces stationed at "Ground Zero". Medical units of the Guard worked in conjunction with other DMNA forces providing care at several location including Camp Smith, in Westchester county.

Principal occupational specialties of the New York Guard include, communications, engineering, medical and legal services, provided in support of all components of New York State military forces, i.e., the Army and Air National Guards, Naval Militia and the New York Guard, as well as to civil authorities.

Currently, trained and state certified New York Guard soldiers augment and assist National Guard units in the following missions: Weapons of Mass Destruction [WMD] Decontamination - the joint New York Army National Guard / New York Air National Guard / New York Guard decontamination - or CERF - team was activated by the governor for state duty for 11 days during the 2004 Republican National Convention in New York City, Military Emergency Radio Network - the Guard is assigned to operate the MERN at various locations to insure the free flow of information during an emergency, and Search And Rescue (SAR) a secondary mission to the state- New York Guard SAR teams have been mobilized, most recently in the summer of 2006 to search for a missing camper in the Adirondack Mountains preserve.

The 244th Medical Clinic works with the NY Army National Guard Medical Command (MEDCOM), augmenting National Guard personnel for within-state MEDCOM missions. These have included screening of National Guard personnel in Soldier Readiness Programs (SRP) and 'reintegration' programs for both soldiers and their families upon troops' return from overseas deployment.

In addition to its SAR work as a secondary mission under the New York State Defense Emergency Act and Article 2-B of State and Local, Natural and Man-Made disasters Act, engineer units of the NY Guard 10th Brigade have built facilities for the National Guard.

Civil Affairs units provide legal services to about-to-deploy troops such as wills and counseling on legal protections under federal and state law.

The New York Guard augments the capabilities of the National Guard, serving only within New York State. Guard personnel are drawn from almost every profession - from plumbers to professors, clerks and CEOs, persons with long prior military service and those without, and every part of the state.

The headquarters unit of the New York Guard is located at Camp Smith, Cortlandt Manor, NY. Camp Smith is a New York State military reservation. It is adjacent to Peekskill, NY and about 35 miles north on New York City.

Training

All New York Guard enlisted recruits, unless they have prior military experience, must attend Initial Entry Training (IET). After completion of one week of IET at Camp Smith, soldiers may take any of the following courses based on their Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) and rank. Officers, unless they have prior commissioned military experience, must complete a branch immaterial officer's basic course after appointment.

NYG Schools

The following schools are offered by the New York Guard.

Initial Entry Training
Basic and Advanced Search and Rescue
Basic and Advanced Communications
Basic Non-Commissioned Officer Course (BNCOC)
Advanced Non-Commissioned Officer Course (ANCOC)
Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) given in concert with FEMA/DHS
Officer Candidate School (OCS) and Basic
Company Grade and Field Grade Officer courses.

Additional Training

Most NYG soldiers have augmented their training by taking courses with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and various other local and state agencies.

Major Subordinate Commands

The Major Subordinate Commands of the New York Guard are:

10th Brigade, covering the Capital Region and northern New York, headquartered in Troy, NY;
14th Brigade, covering the Long Island Region, headquartered in Whitestone, NY;
56th Brigade, covering the Lower Hudson Valley, headquartered in Peekskill, NY;
65th Brigade, covering Western New York, headquartered in Buffalo, NY;
88th Brigade, covering New York City, headquartered in upper Manhattan;
12th Regimental Training Institute, headquartered at Camp Smith, Cortlandt Manor, NY;
244th Medical Clinic, headquartered at Camp Smith, and an
Air Augmentation Detachment. The AAD, headquartered in Latham, a suburb of Albany, NY, was dissolved in Fall 2007 and its staff absorbed into other units of the New York Guard.

New York Guard Commander
Fergal (Ferg) I. Foley
Major General, New York Guard

The size and unit diversity of the New York State Guard
is an indicator of what a State Defense Force can and should be.

2010-10-21T20:32:00.000-07:00

http://securitydebrief.adfero.com/2010/10/21/the-not-so-secret-world-of-state-defense-forces/

By Jena Baker McNeill
Homeland Security Policy Analyst at The Heritage Foundation

Last week, Time Magazine led with the story, “Locked and Loaded: The Secret World of Extreme Militias.” Page after page, the article describes renegade, anti-government militia groups. The article, in its coverage of militia groups, however, makes one glaring omission: State Defense Forces (SDF).

If you haven’t heard of them, don’t worry. Most Americans have not. These forces receive little press and little public attention and largely operate under the radar. However, in the hours after the attacks of September 11, 2001, the New York Guard, New York Naval Militia, and New Jersey Naval Militia, all state defense forces, were found aiding first responders – saving lives and property. Following Hurricane Katrina, some 2,274 members of the nations SDFs, from as many as eight states, were there supporting recovery and response. At 14,000 individuals strong, SDFs should not be overlooked.

SDFs are a far cry from the militant forces described by Time. In fact, State Defense Forces are authorized by state law and are under the control of state governors and senior state military leaders. Their missions vary from state to state, but they exist largely to back the National Guard in emergency response situations. Yet, unlike the National Guard, they receive no federal funding or support and remain under state control at all times.

Twenty-three states and territories have already created them. Yet, in some states they remain under funded and under supported. This may seem to make sense in the face of state budget cuts, but SDFs are actually a low-cost means for states to enhance homeland security efforts without relying on the bureaucratic federal apparatus.

A recent survey by the Heritage Foundation showed that only four of the thirteen responding SDFs pay their members and then only when they were called to active duty. The rest rely solely on volunteers – something that often appeals to former military folks – but also retired or even current professionals like doctors, chaplains, lawyers, and law enforcement officers (even clinical psychologists).

Creating and maintaining State Defense Forces is a simple and effective way for states to enhance the safety and security of its citizens. The federal government should support states in these efforts, maybe even provide training and technical support where possible. But the beauty of SDFs is that they operate entirely separate from the feds. This is especially true for high-risk areas, those prone to natural disasters and acts of terrorism, but many of these states have yet to create an SDF.

It’s a common phrase in homeland security circles that state and locals are in charge of their own disaster response. At times, many doubt whether this is actually true, as FEMA continues to subsidize more and more routine disasters. The creation and support of SDFs, however, is an additional step towards putting state and locals back in the driver’s seat.

2010-10-14T08:12:00.000-07:00

"No free government was ever founded or ever preserved its liberty, without uniting the characters of the citizen and soldier in those destined for the defense of the state.... Such are a well regulated militia, composed of the freeholders, citizen and husbandman, who take up arms to preserve their property, as individuals, and their rights as freemen." - State Gazette (Charleston), September 8, 1788

From the Heritage Foundation on the need for modern State Defense Forces

2010-10-09T02:29:00.000-07:00

http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/10/The-21st-Century-Militia-State-Defen

Abstract: State militias have helped to defend the United States since the Revolutionary War. Today, 23 states and territories have organized militias, most commonly known as State Defense Forces (SDFs). SDFs provide governors with a cost-effective, vital force multiplier and resource, especially if state National Guard units are deployed out of state. However, in general, SDFs are underfunded and undersupported. Some states at high risk for a natural or man-made disaster have not even created SDFs. The U.S. and its states can no longer afford to sideline these national security assets.

Since the founding of the United States of America, local militias have played an important role in its defense and security. Bolstered by the Founding Father’s concerns about maintaining a large standing army and preserved within the Constitution, the concept of the citizen soldier has since become ingrained in American culture and government.

Currently, 23 states and territories have modern militias. As of 2005, these militias had a force strength of approximately 14,000 individuals nationwide.[1] Most commonly known as State Defense Forces (SDFs) or state militias, these forces are distinct from the Reserves and the National Guard in that they serve no federal function. In times of both war and peace, SDFs remain solely under the control of their governors, allowing the governors to deploy them easily and readily in the event of a natural or man-made disaster.

Building on a strong U.S. militia tradition, today’s State Defense Forces offer a vital force multiplier and homeland security resource for governors throughout the nation. SDFs can greatly fortify homeland security efforts in the states by serving as emergency response and recovery forces. Consequently, state leaders should make strengthening existing SDFs a priority, while encouraging their creation in states that do not yet have SDFs, especially in states at high risk of a natural or man-made disaster.

This paper is the result of a first attempt by any organization to conduct a comprehensive survey of the nation’s SDFs. The Heritage Foundation sent surveys to the leaders of all 23 of the nation’s SDFs, and 13 responded. This paper analyzes their responses, looks at the history of the SDFs and the issues and challenges that they face, and makes recommendations on expanding the SDF role in homeland security.

From the Founding Through Today

Informed by British history and colonialism, many of the Founding Fathers believed that a large standing army could easily become an instrument of tyranny.[2] Nevertheless, the onset of the Revolutionary War clearly demonstrated the undeniable need to field a unified, professional national defense force to defeat the British. Thus, in 1775, despite the colonies’ long reliance on militias to defend their territories, the Continental Congress created the Continental Army, the nation’s first standing military force.[3]

However, creation of the Continental Army did little to impede the continued existence of militias throughout the nation. While militias were decidedly less effective during the Revolutionary War than the Continental Army, they nevertheless contributed to the war effort. In the early battles and later as auxiliary support to the Continental Army, the militia helped to win the war, securing their continued role in the nation.[4]

Ultimately, despite misgivings about the effectiveness of militias, the Founding Fathers incorporated their belief that a well-regulated militia was “the ultimate guardian of liberty” into the Constitution.[5] Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution states:

The Congress shall have the power…to provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;

To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.[6]

The language of the Constitution granted the federal government the power to call forth the militia of the United States, but left the states the ability to appoint officers and to train their militias.

Five years after the Constitution was ratified, state militia powers were more firmly defined by the Militia Act of 1792, which required all free men ages 18 to 45 to serve in the enrolled militia. Further, laying the basis for principles that guide today’s State Defense Forces, the act dictated that the Adjutant General (TAG) of each state would command the militia and that state militias would receive no federal funds. At the same time, however, the Calling Forth Act of 1792 gave the President power to mobilize any and all state militia forces when the nation was under threat of invasion or in times of “insurrections in any State.”[7]

However, the Militia Act and Calling Forth Act did not end the contest between state governors and the federal government for control over militia forces. Within a few decades, this debate reached the Supreme Court. In 1827, the Court ruled in Martin v. Mott that the President had the exclusive right to determine if conditions warranted mobilization of militia forces. However, in 1820, the Court held in Houston v. Moore that states maintained concurrent authority with the President to mobilize the militia in the event of a natural disaster, civil unrest, insurrection, or invasion. This decision helped to set the basis for the modern state-apportioned militias.[8]

By the end of the War of 1812, the militias enrolled under the Militia Act of 1792 had largely declined as population growth made their size unwieldy and ineffective.[9] As states increasingly abolished mandatory militia service, volunteer militias became more prevalent. During the Civil War, the combined force of enrolled and volunteer militias proved more useful than in any previous war. Northern militias acted both independently and in conjunction with the U.S. Army to guard prisoners, man forts, and protect the coast, freeing up federal troops for duty elsewhere.[10]

Despite their utility during the Civil War, volunteer militia forces remained largely disparate and disorganized bodies until the 20th century. In 1903, the latest Militia Act (the Dick Act) transformed all state militia forces into units of the National Guard.[11] While this measure helped to professionalize and organize the U.S. militia, World War I created unforeseen challenges for state governors.

Within months of the U.S. entrance into World War I, the entire National Guard Force of more than 300,000 guardsmen was mobilized for active duty.[12] Deprived of their National Guard units and concerned about sabotage and espionage attempts on the mainland, governors began to call for the creation of home defense forces or organized state militias. The Home Defense Act of 1917 permitted the states to raise home defense forces in cases where the National Guard had been federalized.[13] By December 1917, eight months after the U.S. entered the war, 42 states had formed home guards or State Defense Forces with a total force strength of approximately 100,000 men.[14] After World War I, most SDF units were disbanded, but they were revived again during World War II,[15] growing to 150,000 members in 46 states and Puerto Rico.[16]

After World War II, militias again declined, and circumstances did not prompt creation of large State Defense Forces until late in the Cold War. In the 1950s, Congress again passed legislation supporting the formation of state militias.[17] However, the creation and expansion of SDFs throughout the United States remained slow until U.S.–Soviet relations worsened and détente collapsed in the late 1970s.[18]

At the same time that the Cold War was driving the expansion of State Defense Forces, the unpopularity of the Vietnam War led to a drive to end conscription. In 1969, President Richard Nixon established a commission to determine how best to abolish the draft. The Gates Commission concluded that the best alternative to conscription would be an all-volunteer force. However, creating and maintaining this all-volunteer force would rely heavily on the Total Force Concept, which called for complete integration of all Active and Reserve components. Further, the Total Force Concept’s heavy reliance on Reserve forces increased the likelihood that states would be left without their National Guard troops if they were deployed overseas.[19] This realization led many states to revive their SDFs in the 1980s. Ultimately, in 1983, Congress amended the National Defense Act to authorize all states to maintain permanent State Defense Forces.[20]

The Modern Militia: State Defense Forces

At present, 23 states and territories have SDFs, and their estimated force strength totaled 14,000 members as of 2005.[21] Authorized under federal statute Title 32 of the U.S. Code, SDFs are entirely under state control—unlike the National Guard— both in peace and otherwise.[22] Hence, while the National Guard is a dual-apportioned force that can be called to federal service under Title 10 or remain a state force under Title 32, State Defense Forces serve solely as Title 32 forces.

This status gives SDFs two important advantages. First, SDFs are continually stationed within their respective states and can be called up quickly and easily in times of need. Such a capability is particularly important when catastrophic disasters overwhelm local first responders and federal forces can take up to 72 hours to respond.[23] Second, SDFs are exempt from the restrictions of the Posse Comitatus Act, which prohibits federal military forces from engaging in domestic law enforcement activities within the United States.[24] While the Posse Comitatus Act has never proven a major obstacle to deploying federal forces for domestic emergency response, SDFs permit a state military response uninhibited by legal obstacles.[25]

Each SDF is under the control of its respective governor through the state’s military department.[26] The Adjutant General, the state’s senior military commander and a member of the governor’s cabinet, commands the SDF on behalf of the governor. As SDF commander, TAG is responsible for all training, equipment allocation, and decisions regarding the SDF’s strength, activity, and mission. The Adjutant General is also the commander of the state’s National Guard units and often directs state emergency response.[27] Through TAGs, SDFs can easily coordinate with other key components of the state emergency response.

Despite its recognition in federal statute, creation of a State Defense Force remains at the discretion of each state governor, and 28 states have chosen not to create such forces. Creation of SDFs has met resistance from TAGs and the National Guard Bureau due to concerns over turf, costs, and even arming SDF members.[28] However, such objections make little sense given that SDFs are entirely volunteer organizations and offer the states a vital, low-cost force multiplier. Members are not paid for training, only some states compensate them for active duty, and SDFs generally have little equipment.[29] For example, in 2002 alone, the Georgia State Guard reportedly saved the state of Georgia $1.5 million by providing 1,797 days of operational service to the state.[30] In all, the state-apportioned status, organizational structure, and low-cost burden of SDFs make them a vital and practical resource for the states.

State Defense Forces Post-9/11

Only months before 9/11, the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (the Hart– Rudman Commission) suggested making homeland security the primary mission of the National Guard.[31] However, after September 11, 2001, National Guard deployments reached their highest level since the Korean War.[32] This was understandably troubling to many state leaders given that “[g]overnors have the greatest responsibility for managing consequences of attacks,” but “[t]hey have the fewest resources with which to do it…only the state police and the National Guard to provide for law and order.”[33] In recent years, the high levels of National Guard deployment largely removed this resource from numerous states. Even in the states where National Guard forces remain present, the Guard is maintaining only about 62 percent of its equipment on hand for the states because of overseas deployments.[34] This has left some governors with just state police units to help to maintain security and facilitate emergency response. In addition, an emergency, particularly a catastrophic disaster, could quickly overwhelm state police and other first responders. If National Guard forces are unavailable because they are deployed elsewhere, then the state could rely on its SDF, if it has one, to reinforce police and first responders. While largely underdeveloped and underresourced, SDFs can fill this gap in state homeland security capabilities, giving governors a valuable force multiplier.

In recent years, State Defense Forces have proven vital to homeland security and emergency response efforts. For example, after 9/11, the New York Guard, New York Naval Militia, and New Jersey Naval Militia were activated to assist in response measures, recovery efforts, and critical infrastructure security.[35] An estimated 2,274 SDF personnel participated in support of recovery efforts after Hurricane Katrina. SDF personnel were activated in at least eight states, including Texas, Maryland, Virginia, and Tennessee. They assisted directly with recovery efforts or stayed in their states to fill the roles of the state National Guard units that were deployed to assist in the recovery.[36] SDFs have also offered critical infrastructure protection. In Operation Noble Eagle, the homeland defense and civil support operation after 9/11, the Alaskan SDF aided in the efforts to protect the Alaska oil pipeline.[37]

History suggests that State Defense Forces may be most valuable in assisting the states in emergency response. In the event of a natural or man-made disaster, the first tier of response is state and local first responders. However, Hurricane Katrina exposed a vital difference between a “normal” disaster and a catastrophic disaster.[38] A catastrophic disaster quickly stresses the resources and capabilities of state and local responders. In such cases, the Title 32 National Guard troops can serve as the second tier of response. Yet given the National Guard’s high operational tempo over the past decade, the state Guard units may be unavailable. Likewise, the third tier, federal support in the form of reserve troops or FEMA assistance, may take up to 72 hours to mobilize and arrive at the scene of the disaster.[39] In contrast, State Defense Forces are by their nature located nearby. They also know the area and the resources at hand, giving them the potential to be a key element of emergency response for the states.

Besides being readily available and continually stationed within states, SDFs can carry out state homeland security missions without any major reorganization, which would be required if Congress were to implement the Hart–Rudman Commission’s recommendation to task the National Guard with this role. Furthermore, by assuming greater homeland security responsibility, SDFs would allow the National Guard to focus more on their Title 10 mission in the global war on terrorism. Moreover, unlike the dual-apportioned National Guard, State Defense Forces could focus more completely on homeland security than the National Guard.

Challenges Faced

State Defense Forces offer an important homeland security asset to many states, but several challenges have prevented these forces from reaching their full potential. Existing SDFs are often underfunded and undersupported, and some vulnerable states have not yet formed SDFs.

One of the greatest challenges to the creation and maintenance of State Defense Forces across the nation is ignorance among state and national security leaders. Many of these leaders are fundamentally unaware of the existence and capabilities of SDFs. This is largely a public relations nightmare for the SDFs because this general ignorance greatly impedes SDF leaders’ efforts to make their cause and merits known.

However, lack of awareness is not the SDFs’ only major public relations challenge. Often those who are aware of SDFs confuse them with private militia forces associated with radical organizations. State Defense Forces are the modern state militias. These forces are government-authorized, organized, professional militias, in sharp contrast to their radical “counterparts.”

SDFs are also limited by the restriction forbidding them from receiving in-kind support from the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD). While SDFs should remain funded solely by the states, in-kind support in the form of equipment and facilities would enhance SDF training and capabilities. However, because the DOD does not directly support SDFs, they cannot use federal resources, even surplus federal equipment and supplies. This is particularly challenging given that many SDFs work closely with their state National Guards. Nevertheless, SDFs are not permitted to use Guard facilities, trucks, or equipment, even when state National Guard troops are deployed elsewhere and SDFs are filling in during their absence.

The Current State of SDFs

The State Defense Forces offer the states a much needed force multiplier for homeland security operations and provide critical support as an auxiliary to the National Guard. While the potential roles of SDFs received heightened attention immediately after 9/11, that attention has faded in recent years.

To assess current SDF resources and capabilities, The Heritage Foundation sent a survey to the leaders of the 23 existing SDFs. Thirteen states—Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, and Virginia—responded, providing a sampling of SDFs from across the United States. While the data received are limited and cannot draw a national picture of State Defense Forces, much can still be learned from the information gathered.

Mission. First, 11 of the 13 respondents indicated that their State Defense Forces have a defined mission under state law, but the identified missions varied greatly from state to state. Some forces focused more on a National Guard auxiliary mission. Other SDFs emphasize homeland security and civil support. The SDFs of Alabama, Georgia, Maryland, New Mexico, Oregon, Tennessee, Vermont, and Virginia identified their mission as acting largely to support the state National Guard. Other states defined their mission as providing communication backup and support, serving as a direct resource of the governor, operating search and rescue efforts, assisting in disaster response, and/or supporting emergency operating agencies and law enforcement as key components.

In emergency response, 10 of the 13 SDFs play a designated role in their state or local emergency operation centers. Several of the SDFs participate in planning disaster mitigation tactics, either at the direction of the state National Guard, the governor, and/or the Adjutant General, rather than following a predetermined plan for disaster mitigation. Others simply encourage greater training and education among their members. Virginia and Georgia have gone so far as to incorporate their SDFs into their state all-hazards or disaster mitigation plans.

Funding. Survey results also support the notion that State Defense Forces provide a cost-effective solution to the problem of maintaining sufficient homeland security manpower at the state level. Only four of the 13 responding SDFs indicated that they pay their members when on active duty. The rest rely solely on volunteer service. Nevertheless, while SDFs are considered a low-cost asset, they still require adequate state funding to ensure that they have the resources necessary to carry out their assigned missions. In this regard, only nine of the 13 SDFs indicated that they receive state-appropriated funds. Yet despite inadequate funding, 10 of the 13 respondents plan to expand their SDFs, clearly reflecting the importance of these forces.

Force Strength. In force strength and composition, 10 of the 13 SDFs had active force strengths above 100 personnel as of January 2010. Vermont, Maryland, Virginia, Tennessee, Indiana, Georgia, and Alabama reported forces of more than 200 members each, and Texas indicated an active force strength of 1,750—the largest of the SDFs.

Yet many high-risk states do not have SDFs. Judging from more than 50 years of actuarial data on natural disasters, certain states face a predictable, high risk of experiencing a natural disaster.[40] Further, an analysis of funding of cities through the Department of Homeland Security’s Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) program has identified the 37 “highest risk” jurisdictions as indicated by the federal government. Of these high-risk states, Arizona, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Missouri, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania lack SDFs.

Additionally, SDF personnel tend to be retired military personnel and other professionals. In all but one of the 13 SDFs, the average age of SDF personnel is 42 years or older. While some point to the higher age of SDF members as a disadvantage, in fact this is a great strength because it often reflects the members’ extensive experience. “In many cases it is not uncommon in a group of four or five SDF officers to find 100 plus years of military experience.”[41] According to survey results, responding SDFs primarily draw on such experience and professional backgrounds in offering medical, financial, and legal aid within the SDF and to the National Guard.

Only Texas, Virginia, and Indiana reported having an SDF naval or marine arm. The Texas, Virginia, and Vermont SDFs have air arms.

Seven of the 13 SDFs reported that they trained and served side by side with the state National Guard on a regular basis. All 13 respondents responded that they conducted regular assessments of their SDFs.

In all, the survey data show that too many SDFs receive insufficient recognition and support. Because they are predominantly volunteer organizations, their capabilities tend to be overlooked. Yet the states with SDFs should seek to expand the size, scope, and utility of their SDFs to provide themselves with a dynamic resource at a low cost. High-risk states without SDFs should seriously consider forming them. In addition to receiving greater federal recognition and in-kind support as well as state resources, SDFs should be given the opportunity to train side by side with their National Guard counterparts. SDFs will be a significantly greater asset to their states if they are more professionally trained and equipped.

Expanding the Role of SDFs in Homeland Security

In 2009, the State Defense Force Improvement Act (H.R. 206) was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives. The bill would have amended Title 32 of the U.S. Code to enhance the nation’s SDFs.[42] The bill sought to clarify federal regulation of SDFs and to improve standardization and coordination with the DOD and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). However, since its introduction, H.R. 206 has been on hold.

Expansion and enhancement of SDFs remains vital to homeland security. To further such efforts, state leaders, Congress, the DOD, and the DHS should:

Promote the creation of SDFs in high-risk states. Only 23 states and territories have SDFs. The hesitation of many governors makes little sense given that SDFs offer a low-cost force multiplier for homeland security efforts. In particular, the high-risk states without SDFs would greatly benefit from creating SDFs for disaster recovery and response efforts.
Create state standards and clarify federal regulation. Clarifying federal regulation would provide a clearer picture on SDFs’ powers and mission. At the same time, creating state standards for tactics, techniques, and organization based on the needs of each individual state would strengthen and enhance SDF performance. State standards should be communicated to the Council of Governors and the State Guard Association of the United States to facilitate sharing of best practices among the states.
Incorporate SDFs into state and national emergency management plans. Expanding SDFs while clarifying regulation and setting standards is only the first step. The states, the DOD, and the DHS should ensure that SDFs are incorporated into existing and future emergency management plans and exercises. Including SDFs will help to ensure that all state and national actors in emergency response know their respective roles. Further, emergency management plans and exercises will provide SDFs with greater guidance on what is expected of them in the event of a man-made or natural disaster.
Permit SDFs to train side by side with the National Guard. While SDFs and the National Guard differ in their overall missions, they share emergency management responsibilities in their respective states. In each state, they also have a common commander, the state’s Adjutant General. Having the SDFs train alongside the state National Guards would be an effective use of resources and provide the specialized training needed to strengthen the SDFs. State Defense Forces will be a significantly greater asset to their states if they are more professionally trained and equipped. Accordingly, Congress should amend the law to allow the National Guard to provide assistance to all auxiliary forces, including SDFs and Coast Guard Auxiliaries.[43] This assistance could include technical training, administrative support, and use of National Guard facilities and equipment.
Encourage greater state support and resource allocation, and federal in-kind support. Four of the 13 SDFs do not receive state funding. While SDFs are a low-cost resource, the size and scope of their functionality is hindered by insufficient support and resources. To increase the quality and capability of SDFs, states need to provide adequate support and resources. Additionally, while SDFs should remain solely funded by the states, these forces would greatly benefit from receiving federal in-kind support from the Department of Defense. Allowing SDF members to train at military facilities and to receive excess federal equipment and supplies would greatly benefit the SDFs with minimal burden on the DOD.

The Future of the Modern Militia

There are clear historical, legal, and practical justifications for strengthening the State Defense Forces. Since the founding of this country, militias have played a vital role in fulfilling the constitutional duty of providing for the common defense. Today, as strictly state forces, SDFs continue to provide critical manpower at minimal cost.

Despite the undeniable benefits from having an effective SDF, many SDFs lack the resources and the operational standards needed to make them more effective. Some states at high risk of natural or man-made disasters have not even formed SDFs. The U.S. and its states can no longer afford to sideline these national security assets.

—James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., is Deputy Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies and Director of the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Davis Institute, at The Heritage Foundation. Jessica Zuckerman is a Research Assistant in the Allison Center.

Washington State Guard

2010-08-11T20:10:00.000-07:00

The State of Washington has a small defense force headquartered at Camp Murray, near Tacoma. The State Guard appears to be primarily a training cadre with some duties associated with natural disasters and crowd control. The maximum age to join is 59. All members are volunteers and are unpaid unless called to active duty by the Governor.

Official website: http://washingtonguard.org/wsg/

Mission Statement

The mission of the Washington State Guard is to: Provide units organized, equipped and trained in the protection of life or property and the preservation of peace, order and public safety under competent orders of State authorities.

The Washington State Guard is always ready to: Provide trained personnel to support civil government authority; Provide for the protection and preservation of life or property during natural or manmade disasters or civil emergencies; Rapidly and effectively respond to search, rescue, or recovery operations; Effectively execute State Homeland Defense missions; and Participate as active members and contributing citizens of our local communities.

Commander

COL Terrance LaRue

From a Wikipedia article: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Washington_State_Guard
"The Washington State Guard (WSG) is an unpaid State Defense Force for the U.S. state of Washington. It is the third element of the military forces in the Washington Military Department: the Washington Army National Guard, the Washington Air National Guard and State Guard. While the Army and Air Guard, forming part of the Washington National Guard, can be mobilized to federal service, the WSG is only utilized within Washington and is never deployed out of state."

Current Composition

The Washington State Guard consists of two brigades. The First Infantry Brigade is located at the Seattle Armory and maintains two battalions in Olympia and Everett. The Second Infantry Brigade is located in Spokane. The WSG HQ is located at Camp Murray in Tacoma, Washington. State Guard soldiers drill in a non-pay status one day a month and two days during the summer. However, WSG soldiers can and have been called up to paid State Active Duty to support the Washington Military Department in a variety of missions within the state. They have been deployed to the State Emergency Operation Center and many County Emergency Operation Centers to coordinate National Guard resource request to state/federally declared disasters. State Guard members may resign their enlistment or commission at any time, unless mobilized or in paid State Active Duty status. Most WSG soldiers have served in the military, but some come straight from civilian life.

Despite the terms (e.g. "brigade" and "battalion") used for the units comprising the State Guard, actual personnel strength is cadre only, meaning that while a skeleton organization exists, for real-world deployment the organization would have to be filled by the "calling out" of the unorganized militia of the state by the Governor.

State Laws Governing the Washington State Guard

State Constitution

Article X of the State Constitution establishes the Militia of the State, who is liable for service, and empowers the Legislature to provide for its regulation. In addition, Article III, Section 8 establishes the Governor of the State as the Commander in Chief of the military of the State^[2].

Revised Code of Washington (RCW)

Title 38 of the RCW, entitled "Militia And Military Affairs", contains the laws enacted by the state legislature in response to the requirements of the State Constitution in regulating Washington's military affairs. Chapter 13 of the title contains the laws specifically applicable to the Washington State Guard^[3].

Generally speaking, the state does not provide arms, uniforms or equipment for the Washington State Guard. Guard members are expected to obtain suitable uniforms from appropriate sources at their own expense, and when training must normally make provision of equipment and arms from their own property. As approved by the state Adjutant General, however, the Guard may participate in training opportunities provided by the federal government, and may also take advantage of federally-provided arms and equipment at state expense.

http://apps.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=38.14&full=true

2009-07-13T13:27:00.000-07:00

I am a member of the American Legion. Subsequent to reviewing some articles about Hurricane Katrina and the roles of several state guard organizations in providing support I came across this article in the American Legion Magazine. The author identifies the need for greater implementation of the huge manpower and material resources that are available from American companies, local governments and citizen volunteers that are not being tapped in this time of increasing peril.

Magazine Story

A well-regulated militia

At a time of extended National Guard war deployments, state defense forces cannot be forgotten. In fact, they should be strengthened.

BY JAMES JAY CARAFANO, Lt. Col. US Army, Ret.

When America's founding fathers authored the documents that gave birth to the new republic, they strongly held that few institutions are more important than a well-regulated militia. Large-standing armies, they believed, could become instruments of tyranny. According to consensus, it would be better to rely on volunteer citizen-soldiers to take up arms in times of crisis. Signers of the Constitution enshrined the right of individual states to raise and maintain their own home guards, and local militia became one part of the bedrock of good governance and a vital instrument for the preservation of American liberty.

Since then, the concept of a citizen militia has grown and adapted to suit the needs of a changing nation. One of the first U.S. laws, the Militia Act of 1792, required all free white males between 18 and 45 to arm themselves and attend local musters. The law was never seriously enforced, and over the course of the century, militias consisted mostly of local volunteer military organizations that varied widely in scope and character. While the militia never evolved quite as Congress intended, citizen service became ingrained in American culture. During the Civil War, for example, Union volunteer forces dwarfed the numbers of the regular Army. The citizen-soldier concept became more formalized in the wake of the Spanish-American War, and by the outbreak of World War I, the American militia system was much more regularized, as it is today in the form of the Army and Air National Guard.

One element of a well-regulated volunteer militia, state defense forces, doesn't get much attention but could play a vital role in keeping the nation safe, free and prosperous in the 21st century, especially during a time of extended war-zone deployments by National Guard units. U.S. law allows states to raise and maintain SDFs. As the emergency response to Hurricane Katrina demonstrated, they can be an important supplement to the National Guard, particularly during disasters. When trained, disciplined and well-organized, local responders can provide immediate aid and security. Congress and the Bush administration should encourage states to better organize, train and equip these volunteer units. State to state, the levels of interest and support for SDFs vary greatly, from the vital and strong to the nonexistent.

Prominence to Passé and Back Again. State defense forces first rose to prominence during World War I, when most National Guard troops were federalized and shipped overseas. A few states, mostly in the Northeast, organized formal "home guards" made up of local volunteers. About 100,000 armed and trained SDF volunteers guarded key infrastructures and secured the coastlines and land frontiers during the war.

During World War II, about 200,000 of these home-guard volunteers, with U.S. War Department support, replaced the mobilized National Guard. California, for example, was so concerned with the threat of Japanese sneak attack that it spent $40 million on its guard during the course of the war. After Pearl Harbor, the California State Guard expanded to 20,000 members. During the Cold War, many states relied on their defense forces to support civil-defense missions.

The Special Defense Force program was revived in 1980, on the premise that SDF personnel would have to replace the National Guard on the home front if troops were mobilized to fight in Europe. The total number across the nation peaked at about 20,000.

As the Cold War wound down, interest in the state forces lapsed. With the implementation of the total-force concept at the Pentagon and the success of the all-volunteer military, Washington increasingly emphasized the National Guard, increasing its funding, training, modernization and professionalism. As a result, states were content to rely on the Guard. Also at the time, concerns over civil defense had waned. Many state adjutant generals cut funding, ignored or even disbanded their SDF units. Post-Cold War SDFs throughout the United States soon became loosely organized volunteer organizations serving mostly in ceremonial capacities, along with a few small but effective state organizations. Currently, 23 states maintain state defense forces of some kind, with a nationwide total of about 14,000 personnel.

Now, however, with increasing worries over homeland security and natural disasters - along with the frequent and extended deployment of National Guard units - some states have renewed their interest in the SDF concept. One of the greatest values of the program is that it requires absolutely no new legal framework. States can build robust, practical, efficient organizations under existing authorities. The Constitution and U.S. Code Title 32, Sec. 309, authorize state defense forces. An SDF is under the command of the governor and reports to the state's adjutant general. The state's constitution and laws prescribe the force's duties and responsibilities.

Unlike the National Guard, SDFs are state-only and not funded by the federal government. In order to use armories, train at military installations and receive in-kind support, states have to comply with federal standards for the National Guard in matters of accession, training, uniforms and discipline. SDF personnel receive no pay for training but may be paid for active duty under state control.

Called to Duty. Hurricane Katrina revived public awareness of SDFs. Several thousand home-guard personnel from at least eight states helped in the aftermath of the 2005 disaster along the Gulf Coast. Louisiana activated all of its SDF units. About 150 members were used in support of the Louisiana National Guard. Mississippi also activated all of its state guard personnel, principally in support of the Army National Guard, to provide security and to operate shelters. Under the direction of the adjutant general, Alabama SDF personnel assisted in providing security and supporting operations of the Alabama National Guard.

The Texas State Guard activated more than 1,000 members to paid active duty. Medical and military police units received evacuees at Kelly Air Force Base and supported operations at the Houston Astrodome, and at shelters in four other locations within Texas. Georgia SDF personnel were activated on unpaid status to process evacuees through Dobbins Air Reserve Base, and to provide medical and administrative support and security for shelters. Virginia used about 100 unpaid volunteers as part of the Katrina response operation. This allowed additional members of the Virginia National Guard to deploy to the Gulf Coast. Members of the Virginia defense force assisted in the deployment of National Guard units and provided security for armories. The Tennessee State Guard was alerted Sept. 1 and activated 150 volunteers to secure and support shelter operations at several locations.

The Maryland Defense Force Medical Command made one of the most notable and interesting deployments. Within five days of the storm, the command had organized and was ready to send in 22 medical and support personnel to help with relief efforts. The team was linked with 68 volunteers drawn from health and mental-hygiene offices across the state. It was a unique mix that combined desperately needed medical services with a military-like command-and-control headquarters that could arrange transportation and support. In effect, the medical volunteers instantly became a temporary SDF team. The new unit was virtually created on the tarmac before two Maryland Air National Guard C-130 crews flew the volunteers straight into the disaster area. The command set up six treatment stations and provided care for more than 6,000 victims.

A Renewed Role. Katrina demonstrated the difference between a normal disaster and a catastrophe. Normal disasters call for a cascading response: local community resources have primary responsibility and, when their resources are overwhelmed, they seek aid from the state. When state assets are exhausted, the federal government steps in. The process usually takes days.

In catastrophic disasters, state and local responders are stressed from the start. In these situations, it is vital to draw on volunteer groups to help until federal authorities can mobilize.

State governors have great responsibility for preparedness and response to catastrophic emergencies, but they have few resources available to them other than their National Guards. SDFs provide a low-cost way for states to increase capability and to organize other volunteer groups during times of crisis. However, they have received hit-and-miss attention. Some state adjutant generals want strong and effective SDFs as part of their state military departments. Others resist SDFs because of the additional burden of managing them. Historically, the Pentagon has offered little support or advice to states about SDFs. While the Department of Homeland Security promotes volunteer participation in national preparedness and response programs, it, too, has paid scant attention to SDFs.

Neglecting this kind of service is a mistake. With National Guard forces being called to active duty more frequently than at any time since the Korean War, the need for SDFs to provide backup support to the states is not only apparent - it's obvious.

Making It Work. A special defense force should be at the core of any state's volunteer services in times of crisis. SDFs, according to some estimates, could muster up to 250,000 volunteers throughout the country to help handle disasters anywhere, providing a plethora of services from medical aid to rebuilding infrastructure.

Congress can help by establishing a legislative framework to require appropriate cooperation between DoD, Homeland Security and state governments on SDF matters. One bill, the State Defense Force Improvement Act, was introduced by U.S. Reps. Joe Wilson, R-S.C., and Lincoln Davis, D-Tenn. The act seeks congressional recognition of state defense forces as "an integral military component of the nation's homeland security effort" under state control, and for use at the state level in accordance with state laws. The measure would also authorize the Pentagon and Department of Homeland Security to provide limited support for SDF at no direct cost to the federal government.

States do not have to wait for Washington. Texas, Maryland and others offer a number of models and best practices that can be adopted right now to make local SDF units more robust and effective. State officials and local leaders can achieve a great deal at little cost if they invest only a modest amount of effort in establishing, organizing or revitalizing their SDF capabilities.

In the national debate over how the United States can best respond to major disasters such as Katrina, Washington does not have all the answers. Strong community response through volunteer groups, such as state defense forces, is an essential part of preparedness and is not too far from what the founding fathers had in mind.

James Jay Carafano, a retired U.S. Army lieutenant colonel, is an expert in military defense and
homeland security at The Heritage Foundation.
A former assistant professor at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, he is the author of many books and studies.

Vermont State Guard

2009-07-02T13:23:00.000-07:00

TheVermont State Guard appears to be larger, or at least more diverse and geographically extensive than most such. From the web site:

Organization

The Vermont State Guard (VSG) is authorized under Title 32, Section 109(C) United States Code; Title 20, Part 3, Chapter 61, Vermont State Statues. Executive Order Number 67, dated 26 April 1982 signed by Richard A. Snelling, Governor of Vermont established the Vermont State Guard. The Vermont State Guard is recognized as a State Defense Force by the National Guard Bureau by NGB regulation 10-4.
In accordance with the Vermont State Statutes Title 20, the Vermont State Guard is to, in the long-term, establish an Emergency Corps for the purpose of providing Internal Security and Public Safety.
In order to be duly prepared in accordance with Executive Order 67, the Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) utilizes three classifications of membership participation as follows:
Cadre: member participation in excess of 75% annually.
Reserve Cadre: member participation in excess of 50% annually.
Emergency: member participates in excess of 5% annually.
Mission:

The mission of the Vermont State Guard is to be duly prepared to perform tasks of Internal Security and Public Safety, as ordered by the Governor of the State, under the direction of The Adjutant General State of Vermont

The Vermont State Guard is looking for dedicated men and women who are ready to volunteer to serve their state. Former military service members or experienced civilian career trained individuals, between the ages of 17 and 70 and possessing the skills, knowledge and commitment needed to perform organizational readiness and multi-tasking in an emergency, are desired by the Vermont State Guard.

17 to 70... now that is more like the traditional militia concept.

The Vermont State Guard is to be trained to perform multi-tasks for Internal Security and Public Safety operations. Areas of concentration are, but not limited to, the following:
-Safety traffic control
-Security patrol
-Shelter Management
-Emergency Medical Operations
-Mass care
-Support of the military community and their families
-Conduct emergency response training to VSG members and other individuals in the community.

The TOand E shows 4 general officers, 5 battalions composed of a total of 19 companies, an air wing (as in Air Force??), an army aviation unit, and a medical battalion spread across the state with some communities hosting units as small as the the squad level. Here is the application form. Could it be any simpler?

Print and complete the application below and submit to:

Vermont National Guard
Green Mountain Armory
Attn: Colonel Suzanne Devoid
Vermont State Guard
Vermont National Guard Road
Colchester, VT 05446-3099

APPLICATION TO JOIN
THE VERMONT STATE GUARD
(Application Form - Web Download)

ZIP CODE: _____________

(VSG Use Only)

Name: Date of Birth: M q F q

(MM/DD/YY)

Address:
ZIP:
E-mail Address:
Home Tel: Work Tel: Cell #: Fax: #:
Social Security Number:

Civilian Education Level:
Civilian occupation(s):
Special interest, talents, hobbies, avocations, licenses, etc.:

Have you ever been convicted of a felony: NO YES ___ (Explain):

Prior military service: YES NO , If yes what branch

Highest rank or grade attained: Job title(s):

Insert years of service as applicable (YY - YY):

	Nat'l Guard	Reserve	Active Duty
■ Army ......................................................................
■ Air Force ...............................................................
■ Marines Corps .....................................................
■ Navy ........................................................................
■ Coast Guard .........................................................
■ US Public Health Service ...................................................................................................
■ National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Commission Corps ..............

q I certify that I am of good health and would be available to serve if asked by proper authority.
q I am interested in being considered for current membership CADRE STATUS in the VSG.
q I am interested in being placed on the waiting list for future consideration RESERVE STATUS in the VSG.
q I am interested in being placed on the waiting list for future consideration EMERGENCY STATUS in the VSG.

Applicant Signature: Date:
Position(s) considered:
Recruiter Signature: Date:
Recruiter's Unit:

VSG Use Only:
Assigned to: Roster No. BN Co Assigned Position # Co Attached

VTSG Pam 600-1 (June 24, 2002)

Oregon, Militia in a People's Paradise

2009-06-13T09:56:00.000-07:00

Today I will review the armed service of the State of Oregon, the Oregon State Defense Force. This organization traces its roots to 1853, at the time of the first Territorial militia, however it was formally established about 1917 as the Oregon National Guard Reserve in response to the federalization of the Oregon National Guard. It became known as the Oregon State Defense Force about 40 years ago.

Legislation:

Oregon Statutes - Chapter 399 - Organized Militia - Section 399.035 - Oregon State Defense Force.

(1) In addition to the federally recognized Oregon National Guard subject to call or order to federal service under laws of the United States, there shall be organized within the state a National Guard Reserve force. Such force shall be known as the Oregon State Defense Force, and shall be composed principally of officers, warrant officers and enlisted persons not eligible for general service under federal selective service laws.

(2) In time of peace the Oregon State Defense Force shall be maintained at cadre strength in numbers to be determined by the Governor.

(3) In time of peace the mission of the Oregon State Defense Force shall be to augment the Oregon National Guard as an internal security force. In time of war, it shall replace the Oregon National Guard as a state force when the National Guard is ordered into federal service.

(4) Whenever laws of the United States authorize the organization of such state forces under federal recognition, the Governor shall promulgate such regulations as are necessary to comply with such federal laws and obtain federal recognition for the force authorized by this section. [1961 c.454 §41; 1989 c.361 §6]

Note the succinct yet spare character of this legislation, particularly as compared to many other states. Paragraph (4) refers to recognition by the federal government.

U.S. Code:

TITLE 32 > CHAPTER 1 > § 109

Prev | Next

§ 109. Maintenance of other troops

(a) In time of peace, a State, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the District of Columbia, Guam, or the Virgin Islands may maintain no troops other than those of its National Guard and defense forces authorized by subsection (c).

(b) Nothing in this title limits the right of a State, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the District of Columbia, Guam, or the Virgin Islands to use its National Guard or its defense forces authorized by subsection (c) within its borders in time of peace, or prevents it from organizing and maintaining police or constabulary.

(c) In addition to its National Guard, if any, a State, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the District of Columbia, Guam, or the Virgin Islands may, as provided by its laws, organize and maintain defense forces. A defense force established under this section may be used within the jurisdiction concerned, as its chief executive (or commanding general in the case of the District of Columbia) considers necessary, but it may not be called, ordered, or drafted into the armed forces.

(d) A member of a defense force established under subsection (c) is not, because of that membership, exempt from service in the armed forces, nor is he entitled to pay, allowances, subsistence, transportation, or medical care or treatment, from funds of the United States.

(e) A person may not become a member of a defense force established under subsection (c) if he is a member of a reserve component of the armed forces.

There is also Oregon legislation dealing with military justice. This serves to provide standards of conduct roughly analogous to that provided federal forces under the Uniform Code of Military Justice and is titled The Oregon Code of Military Justice.

From the Oregon Defense Force web site:

Member Obligations

The members of the Oregon State Defense Force (ORSDF) are enlisted by contract or commissioned by the Governor. Members are required to execute the oath of office and may, at their request, resign from the ORSDF at anytime.

1-4 Obligations of ORSDF members:

1. Membership in the ORSDF is voluntary and open to prior service individuals who wish to continue participation in service to the State of Oregon. However, the ORSDF Commander may approve membership and uniform wear to individuals with critical civilian acquired skills such as language experts, legal professionals or communication technicians.

2. Members of the ORSDF must: (a) Satisfactory attend scheduled training and administrative meetings. (b) Be physically capable of walking, bending, and lifting at least ten (10) pounds. (c) Adhere to standard military dress code and customs of service. (d) Obey the directives of the TAG through Chain of Command. (e) Normally serves without pay. However, under some circumstances and if budget permits, the State may reimburse for travel, lodging, and training costs. Members may also be put on State Active Duty (SAD) and be paid in accordance with SAD directives.

3. Individuals without military experience or background can volunteer for the ORSDF Museum Auxiliary, but are not authorized wear of the military uniform.

4. Adhere to standard military dress code and customs of the service.

5. Work as individuals or together as a unit to perform specified duties, when directed by the Adjutant General. Normally volunteers will train without pay. Under special circumstances the costs incurred by the individual in the performance of their training or duties may be reimbursed.

6 . The Adjutant General may order individuals, separate units or the entire ORSDF to state service. When ordered to state active duty, members are paid at their current authorized pay for their military rank. ( Time and grade.)

7. When on state active duty, ORSDF personnel are subject to the provisions of ORS Title 32, Military Affairs; Emergency Services as well as the OCMJ (Oregon Code of Military Justice) as well as other military department, including ORSDF, published regulations.

Note that Oregon requires members to be prior federal or National Guard service, with exceptions determined by civilian skill sets. In this regard the OSDF does not comply with the standard typical of other state guard forces and the federal definition of militia. Perhaps, in that sense, it would fair to claim that the OSDF is not militia. As well, there is no obligation of service term, members may resign at will anytime.

Components:
The OSDF lists 3 Regimental Groups under command of a Colonel or Lt. Colonel, and 8 Regimental operations teams under the command of a Lt. Colonel or a Major. My subjective impression is that these formations are cadre, in place in communities across the state, with the intention of providing training to citizens who volunteer or are called up by the Governor as unorganized militia to flesh out the the regimental structures in the event the Oregon National Guard is federalized and called away. Or if the zombies attack.
As well there are:
Headquarters-Headquarters Detachment (HHD)
Special Troops Detachment (support)
Military History Detachment and Museum
Oregon State Defense Force Pipe Band
Oregon State Defense Force Auxiliary

The Pipe Band may well be the best recruiting tool the OSDF has, as when I called the phone number at HQ, I got a voice message stating the office is open on Tuesday from 9 to 1. I do hope that is not a reflection of their budget.

The OSDF Pipe Band looks like a good outfit: http://odfpipeband.com/

In the following weeks I will post information on other states. I believe that the state guard organizations represent a gigantic untapped resource with respect to service by American citizens in a way that many would be not only proud to perform, but grateful for the opportunity.

More from Virginia

2009-06-11T20:02:00.000-07:00

The following is extracted directly from the Virginia Defense Force web site. Thanks to Maccabee.

The Virginia Defense Force (VDF) is the Commonwealth's military reserve. The force is governed by the military laws of Virginia and managed by the Virginia Department of Military Affairs. The chain of command for the force consists of the Governor of Virginia (Commander-in-Chief), Adjutant General of Virginia, and Commanding General of the Virginia Defense Force.
Mission
(Code of Virginia 44-54.4)

The Virginia State Defense Force with a targeted membership of at least 1,200 shall be organized within and subject to the control of the Department of Military Affairs.

When called to state active duty, the mission of the Virginia State Defense Force shall be to

provide for an adequately trained organized reserve militia to assume control of Virginia National Guard facilities and to secure any federal and state property left in place in the event of the mobilization of the Virginia National Guard

assist in the mobilization of the Virginia National Guard

support the Virginia National Guard in providing family assistance to military dependents within the Commonwealth in the event of the mobilization of the National Guard

provide a military force to respond to the call of the Governor in those circumstances described in § 44-75.1

Please note that the relevant legislation calls for a minimum of 1200 members. Note that no reference is made to the VDF being subject to call up or command by federal authorities. The VDF appears to be largely oriented towards providing a training cadre to supplant the Virginia National Guard in the event the Guard is federalized.
Recruits Needed:

If you are looking for a way to enhance your current job skills, learn a new skill or give back to your local community, the Virginia Defense Force (VDF) is currently recruiting volunteers to fill a variety of service needs. Virginia residents with experience or education in the following areas are invited to apply: legal, medical, law enforcement, communications, chaplaincy, logistical/supply, administrative, and other areas.

Membership in the VDF is open to Virginia residents with or without prior military service, ages 16 to 65. Members must have a valid social security number and no felony convictions.

For additional recruiting information, contact VDF Division Headquarters at 804.228.7018 on Tuesdays, Wednesdays or Thursdays or email LT. Henry Howells (henry.c.howells@us.army.mil).

Frequenty Asked Questions:

What are the eligibility requirements for membership in the Virginia Defense Force?

· United States citizens
· A valid Social Security number
· Age 16 to 65 (Minors require written consent of parent or legal guardian.)
· Physical ability to perform in any assigned billet
· No felony convictions
· Good moral character

Are members of the Virginia Defense Force armed?

The Code of Virginia states that "members of the Virginia State Defense Force shall not be armed with firearms during the performance of training duty or state active duty, except under circumstances and in instances authorized by the Governor." (§ 44.54.12)

Are members of the Virginia Defense Force paid?

Members receive pay only while on active duty authorized by the Governor. Pay rates are based on the U.S. Department of Defense's military pay scale and members' rank. Members are not paid for monthly drills or annual field training exercises.

How long are enlistments in the Virginia Defense Force?

Membership in the Virginia Defense Force is voluntary and members may request discharge at any time.

How are ranks assigned to new members of the Virginia Defense Force?

New members of the Virginia Defense Force with prior federal service may enter the force at the same grade held in federal service, provided a billet of matching grade is vacant at time of appointment or enlistment. New members without prior federal service shall be enlisted. New members with certain professional occupations (doctors, lawyers, nurses and pilots) may join the force as commissioned officers if assigned to a billet matching their civilian occupations.

Are members of the Virginia Defense Force required to wear uniforms?

The Code of Virginia requires the force to be uniformed, conforming to standards of dress and appearance prescribed by the Adjutant General of Virginia. The uniform for the Virginia Defense Force is a modified version of the United States Army's legacy Battle Dress Uniform (BDU) which conforms to state specific requirements contained in National Guard Bureau Regulation 10-4. (§ 44.54.9)

What are the medical requirements for membership in the Virginia Defense Force?

While the Virginia Defense Force does not require formal physical testing or training, members must be physically able to perform assigned duties.

Is my job protected if I am ordered to state active duty with the Virginia Defense Force?

The Code of Virginia provides employment protections for members of the Virginia Defense Force and the Virginia National Guard. (§ 44.9

Note that the standards for enlistment more nearly reflect and in some respects exceed the federal definition of militia as defined in the US Code. There is clearly no expectation that VDF personnel will serve under the command of federal armed forces. Aside from the website, I have not as yet dound any other evidence of attempts to recruit to the VDF. The VDF appears to be composed of 3 brigades (infantry?), an aviation battallion, a riverine detachment tasked with domestic maritime search and rescue, a military police company, and a command formation.

Finally, note that VDF personnel are not authorized to be armed except at the orders and discretion of the Commenwealth Governor.

Sharp Cheddar

2009-06-10T22:49:00.000-07:00

As provided by a reader from Virginia:

The Code of Virginia

44-1. Composition of militia.

The militia of the Commonwealth of Virginia shall consist of all able-bodied citizens of this Commonwealth and all other able-bodied persons resident in this Commonwealth who have declared their intention to become citizens of the United States, who are at least sixteen years of age and, except as hereinafter provided, not more than fifty-five years of age. The militia shall be divided into four classes, the National Guard, which includes the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard, the Virginia State Defense Force, the naval militia, and the unorganized militia.

44-2. Composition of National Guard.

A. The National Guard shall consist of the regularly enlisted militia and of commissioned and warrant officers, who shall be residents of the Commonwealth of Virginia and shall fall within the age limits and qualifications as prescribed in existing or subsequently amended National Guard regulations (army and air), organized, armed and equipped as hereinafter provided. Upon original enlistment members of the National Guard shall not be less than seventeen nor more than fifty-five years of age, or, in subsequent enlistments not more than sixty-four years of age. All enlistments in the National Guard of persons under the age of eighteen years made prior to June 27, 1958, shall be held, and the same are hereby declared valid and effective in all respects, if otherwise valid and effective according to the law then in force. B. Notwithstanding the above, persons otherwise qualified but residing outside the Commonwealth of Virginia, may enlist or serve as commissioned or warrant officers in the National Guard.

44-3. Composition of naval militia.

The naval militia shall consist of the regularly enlisted militia between the ages of eighteen and forty-five years, organized, armed, and equipped as hereinafter provided, and commissioned officers between the ages of eighteen and sixty-four years; but enlisted personnel may continue in the service after the age of forty-five years and until the age of sixty-four years, provided the service is continuous.

44-4. Composition of unorganized militia.

The unorganized militia shall consist of all able-bodied persons as set out in � 44-1, except such as may be included in �� 44-2, 44-3, and 44-54.6, and except such as may be exempted as hereinafter provided.

44-5. Exemptions from militia duty.

In addition to those exempted by the laws of the United States, the following persons shall be exempt from military duty under a state call: (1) The officers, judicial and executive, of the governments of the United States and the Commonwealth of Virginia. (2) The members of the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia and of the Congress of the United States. (3) Persons in the active military or naval services of the United States. (4) Customhouse clerks. (5) Persons employed by the United States in the transmission of the mail. (6) The judges and clerks of courts of record. (7) The mayor and councilmen of incorporated cities and towns. (8) Members of the governing bodies of counties. (9) Sheriffs, United States district attorneys, attorneys for the Commonwealth and city attorneys. (10) [Repealed.] (11) Lighthouse keepers. (12) Marine pilots. (13) [Repealed.] (14) All persons who because of religious belief shall claim exemption from military service, if the conscientious holding of such belief by such person shall be established under such regulations as the President of the United States shall prescribe, shall be exempted from militia service in any capacity that the President shall declare to be combatant. (15) Such other persons as may be designated by the Governor in the best interests of the public and of the Commonwealth.

44-52. Dismissal or dishonorable discharge.

No sentence of dismissal from the service or dishonorable discharge, imposed by a National Guard courts-martial not in federal service, shall be executed until approved by the Governor. Any officer convicted by a general courts-martial and dismissed from the service shall be forever disqualified from holding a commission in the militia.

44-75.1. Militia state active duty.

A. The Governor or his designee may call forth the militia or any part thereof to state active duty for service in any of the following circumstances: 1. In the event of invasion or insurrection or imminent threat of either; 2. When any combination of persons becomes so powerful as to obstruct the execution of laws in any part of this Commonwealth; 3. When the Governor determines that a state agency or agencies having law-enforcement responsibilities are in need of assistance to perform particular law-enforcement functions, which functions he shall specify in his call to the militia; 4. In the event of flood, hurricane, fire or other forms of natural or manmade disaster wherein human life, public or private property, or the environment is imperiled; 5. In emergencies of lesser magnitude than those described in subdivision 4, including but not limited to the disruption of vital public services, wherein the use of militia personnel or equipment would be of assistance to one or more departments, agencies, institutions, or political subdivisions of the Commonwealth; 6. When the Governor determines that the National Guard and its assets would be of valuable assistance to state, local or federal agencies having a drug law-enforcement function to combat the flow of or use of illegal drugs in the Commonwealth, he may provide for the National Guard or any part thereof to support drug interdiction, counterdrug and demand reduction activities within the Commonwealth, or outside the Commonwealth under the National Guard Mutual Assistance Counterdrug Activities Compact. In calling forth the National Guard under this section, the Governor shall specify the type of support that the National Guard shall undertake with state, local or federal law-enforcement agencies. Once called forth by the Governor, the National Guard is also specifically authorized to enter into mutual assistance and support agreements with any law-enforcement agencies, state or federal, operating within or outside this Commonwealth so long as those activities are consistent with the Governor's call. All activities undertaken by the National Guard in the areas of drug interdiction, counterdrug and drug demand reduction shall be reported by the Adjutant General's office to the Governor and reviewed by the Governor no less frequently than every three months; and 7. When the Governor or his designee, in consultation with the Adjutant General, determines that the militia or any part thereof is in need of specific training to be prepared for being called forth for any of the circumstances expressed in subdivisions 1 through 6 above. Such training may be conducted with a state or federal agency or agencies having the capability or responsibility to coordinate or assist with any of the circumstances set forth in subdivisions 1 through 6 above. B. The Virginia National Guard shall be designated as a state law-enforcement agency for the sole purpose of receiving property and revenues pursuant to 18 U.S.C. � 981(e) (2), 19 U.S.C. � 1616a, and 21 U.S.C. � 881(e) (1) (A).

44-76. Transportation, equipment and support of militia.

Whenever the Governor shall call forth the militia, whether by virtue of the Constitution or of � 44-75.1, he shall issue such orders and take such measures for procuring and transporting the elements thereof as to him shall seem best; and for their accommodation, equipment and support, he shall appoint such a staff as to him shall seem proper.

44-78.1. Request for assistance by localities.

In the event of the circumstances described in subdivision A 2, 4 or 5 of � 44-75.1 arise within a county, city or town of the Commonwealth, either the governing body or the chief law-enforcement officer of the county, city or town may call upon the Governor for assistance from the militia. The Governor may call forth the militia or any part thereof to provide such assistance as he may deem proper in responding to such circumstances, but in all instances the militia shall remain subject to military command and not to civilian authorities of the county, city or town receiving assistance.

44-80. Order in which classes of militia called into service.

The National Guard, the Virginia State Defense Force, the naval militia and the unorganized militia or any part thereof may be ordered into service by the Governor in such order as he determines.

44-81. Length of service when called out.

The National Guard, the Virginia State Defense Force, the naval militia or the unorganized militia, when called into service by the Governor, shall serve for sixty days after their arrival at the place of rendezvous, unless sooner discharged. But the Governor shall, at all times, have power to retain them in service for such time as, in his judgment, may be necessary; however, except when the whole National Guard or the whole Virginia State Defense Force is not required, no individual shall be retained for a longer period than sixty days except in instances where an individual soldier or airman of the National Guard voluntarily consents to service beyond sixty days.

44-84. Regulations enforced on actual service.

Whenever any portion of the militia shall be called into service to execute the law, suppress riot or insurrection, or to repel invasion, the military justice opinions as set forth in Article 4 (� 44-42 et seq.) of this chapter, and the regulations prescribed for the National Guard of the United States, and the regulations issued thereunder, shall be enforced and regarded as a part of this chapter until such forces shall be duly relieved from such duty.

44-85. Regulations and penalties.

Whenever any part of the unorganized militia is ordered out, it shall be governed by the same rules and regulations and be subject to the same penalties as the National Guard or naval militia.

44-86. When ordered out for service.

The commander in chief may at any time, in order to execute the law, suppress riots or insurrections, or repel invasion, or aid in any form of disaster wherein the lives or property of citizens are imperiled or may be imperiled, order out the National Guard and the inactive National Guard or any parts thereof, or the whole or any part of the unorganized militia. When the militia of this Commonwealth, or a part thereof, is called forth under the Constitution and laws of the United States, the Governor shall order out for service the National Guard, or such part thereof as may be necessary; and he may likewise order out such a part of the unorganized militia as he may deem necessary. During the absence of organizations of the National Guard in the service of the United States, their state designations shall not be given to new organizations.

44-87. Manner of ordering out for service.

The Governor shall, when ordering out the unorganized militia, designate the number to be so called. He may order them out either by calling for volunteers or by draft.

44-88. Incorporation into the Virginia State Defense Force.

Whenever the Governor orders out the unorganized militia or any part thereof, it shall be incorporated into the Virginia State Defense Force until relieved from service.

44-89. Draft of unorganized militia.

If the unorganized militia is ordered out by draft, the Governor shall designate the persons in each county and city to make the draft, and prescribe rules and regulations for conducting the same.

44-90. Punishment for failure to appear.

Every member of the militia ordered out for duty, or who shall volunteer or be drafted, who does not appear at the time and place ordered, shall be liable to such punishment as a court-martial may direct.

This is interesting in that I was unaware that any state had so well defined and legally implemented that element of the Second Amendment of the federal Constitution so thoroughly and clearly. I wonder how this law is treated in fact by the Commonwealth government .

Sharp Cheddar

Peculiar Dynamic

2009-06-09T21:24:00.000-07:00

Obviously this logo is tongue in cheek, even humorous. Sadly, it also represents, in a subjective way, to all to many folks, the popular impression of what militia is and means. Since, under the law, the militia is just about everyone who can and will serve if called, why is it that most people have the impression that the militia is a bunch of right wing extremists? How did this come to pass?

In downtown Portland, Oregon there is a small urban park with a statue of an infantryman from the 2nd Oregon Volunteer Infantry, who served during the Spanish-American War and the so called Philippines Insurrection from 1898 on. These were the true militia. Not National Guard, but rather State of Oregon soldiers who volunteered to serve the nation during time of war. The National Guard, which is for practical purposes a federal military force on loan to the various states, discriminates for membership on much the same basis as the regular Army and reserves. There was no National Guard as such prior to about 1907. There is no sense of general population participation in the traditional meaning of the word militia. Now, many states have what are referred to as State Guards. These are military formations that fall under the state Military Departments and are under the executive command of the respective Governors. In some states they are large and well organized and provide valuable service to the community. In other states they are virtually unknown and and tiny. In many states they do not exist at all. Such a State Guard exists in my state, yet not one state legislator of the 20 or more I have asked has ever heard of it. Several became indignant regarding my allegation of the existence of the State Guard.
Let us go further back in history. During the decades of the American frontier, manifest destiny, and wars with neighboring nations, European empires and native nations there was an ongoing need for a rapid response military formation in almost all rural and some urban communities that was met by local and popularly organized military units with elected leaders. These formations often maintained armories, communications and transport systems. The only legal authorization for their existence lay with the 2nd Amendment of the US Constitution and the respective equivalent passages of the constitutions of the various states. Yet now, such formations are either quasi-legal, illegal or non-existent. Why? Certainly the risk of foreign terrorist acts, domestic upheaval or enemy military attack has never disappeared.

Sharp Cheddar

Militia, Zombies and Cheese

Indiana Guard Reserve (IGR)

The Indiana Guard Reserve (IGR) is a service oriented, community-based, military organization authorized by Indiana law as a supplement to the Indiana Army National Guard based at sixty-six Indiana Army National Guard Armories throughout the State of Indiana.

Alaska State Defense Force, Wikipedia

Alaska State Defense Force

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Mission

Source

Alaska State Defense Force

Description

Mission

Source

Description

Mission

Source

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CARAFANO:

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This is a Testimony On District Of Columbia

Improving the Security of the District of Columbia with a D.C. Defense Force Bill 18-403, “DC Official Code Title 49 Enactment Act of 2009”

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